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I. INTRODUCTION

The interest on lawyers' trust account programs (herein collectively referred to as "IOLTA" programs) all operate on the premise
that client trust funds constitute an unused economic resource which
*Attorney, Florida Justice Institute. B.S. 1962, University of New Hampshire, LL.B. 1965,
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Newark. Research and writing of this article was
supported by funds granted to the Florida Justice Institute by the Legal Services Corporation
and the Ford Foundation to support the National IOLTA Clearinghouse. The author is also
counsel for the Amici Curiae participants supporting the State Bar of California in litigation
challenging California's IOLTA program.
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may bemobilized to generate income to improve the delivery of legal
services to the poor.1 The IOLTA programs authorize attorneys to
pool nominal or short term client trust funds, which before IOLTA
were deposited in interest-free checking accounts, and deposit them
in NOW or Super NOW checking accounts. The interest generated
from these accounts is then used to support legal services to the poor
and to fund other law-related public purposes. If there are no constitutional impediments to using client funds in this fashion, IOLTA
constitutes a significant new source of revenue for these legal
services.
The critical constitutional question raised by IOLTA programs is
whether using clients' monies, which lawyers hold in aggregated trust
accounts, to produce income for public services constitutes a taking
without just compensation contrary to the dictates of the fifth
amendment.2 Those who question the constitutionality of IOLTA
contend the owner of a fund possesses a vested property right to the
earnings of that fund.3 They argue, relying on Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith,4 that a state's action in appropriating
1. IOLTA Programs, as of May 1, 1985, have been approved in 35 states and the District
of Columbia and rejected in four. Initial petitions seeking the adoption of IOLTA programs are
pending before six state supreme courts. IOLTA UPDATE, National IOLTA Clearinghouse, vol.
2, no. 4 (Winter 1985) [hereinafter cited as IOLTA UPDATE]. IOLTA programs began in Australia and have spread to many countries with a common law heritage. Their history and operation
is explained in England & Carlisle, History of Interest on Trust Accounts Program, 56 FLA. B.J.
101 (1982). See also Gonser, Almond & Ziegler, FinancingPublic Services Activities With Interest-Bearing Attorney Trust Accounts, 15 IDAHo L. Rav. 219 (1979) (discussion of the
problems in development of Idaho's public service program for the legal profession with a comparison to Florida's plan); Special Project, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts: A Proposal
For Wisconsin, 66 MARQ. L. Pav. 835 (1983) (the Florida Bar's program is considered in conjunction with the IOLTA proposal for Wisconsin and the constitutional issues raised in implementing such a proposal); Note, Minnesota's New Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts Program, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1286 (1983) (exploring the background and mechanics of the IOLTA
concept with a discussion of the constitutional, tax and fiduciary issues raised); Comment, A
Source of Revenue for the Improvement of Legal Services, PartI: An Analysis of the Plans in
Foreign Countries and Florida Allowing the Use of Clients' Funds Held by Attorneys in NonInterest-Bearing Trust Accounts to Support Programs of the Organized Bar, 10 ST. MARY's
L.J. 539 (1979).
2. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. V (applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment). Chicago, B. &
Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-41 (1897).
3. See Baker & Wood, "Taking" A ConstitutionalLook at The State Bar of Texas Proposal to Collect Interest on Attorney-Client Trust Accounts, 14 TFx TECH L. REV. 327, 357
(1983); Comment, A Critiqueof Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts Programs, 44 LA. L. Rav.
999 (1984).
4. 449 U.S. 155 (1980). The Webb's opinion held unconstitutional on fifth amendment
grounds a Florida statute which permitted counties to invest interpleader funds and retain the
income generated as public revenues. FLA. STAT. § 28.33 (1977). In addition, counties charged a
separate, percentage fee based on the dollar amount of the funds deposited in court. Id.
§ 28.24(14). The result reached in Webb's is intuitively correct. Moreover, it is consistent with
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the earnings of the fund for its own purposes, notwithstanding the
economic realities or desirability of the public purposes served, constitutes a taking. Those who find no fifth amendment violation argue
no property is taken because IOLTA "creates income" which would
never, under any set of circumstances, accrue to the benefit of the
client.5 Moreover, even if a client possesses a property interest in the
earnings potential of his nominal or short term deposits, IOLTA supporters argue the potential for income is so attenuated that shifting
the income to public use does not constitute a taking for purposes of
the fifth amendment.'
The goal of this article is to show the fifth amendment poses no
barrier to the implementation of IOLTA programs. Principles of both
property and taking law demonstrate the client's claim to the income
is not valid. The client lacks a property interest, as the term "property" is interpreted for purposes of the fifth amendment. Moreover,
prior case law. See Morton Grove Park Dist. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 78 Ill. 2d
353, 399 N.E.2d 1295 (1980). Both Coudert v. United States, 175 U.S. 178 (1899) and Branch v.
United States, 100 U.S. (10 Otto.) 673 (1879), held, as a matter of statutory construction, that
monies paid into court during contested litigation did not, thereby, become public monies.
United States v. Minnesota Mut. Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212 (1925), held, also as a matter of statutory construction, that the interest on funds paid into court belonged to the owner of the fund.
Constitutional claims were neither raised nor considered. See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 473 (1951).
The acceptance of Webb's is evident from the lack of legal literature devoted directly to that
case. Only one brief comment was found at 67 A.BA. J. 212 (1981). But see Chatham & Phenix
Nat'l Bank v. Guaranty Trust Co., 256 F. 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 642 (1919), reaching the same result that the Florida Supreme Court reached in Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). Of course, Webb's
features prominently in the literature devoted to IOLTA. In response to Webb's, Florida
amended the offending statute to provide that the county retain 10% of the interest income as
a "reasonable investment management fee," while still charging the percentage fee for accepting the deposit. FLA. STAT. § 28.33 (1983). The amended statute has not been challenged.
5. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 395 (Fla. 1981).
6. A truly client-voluntary program does not implicate the fifth amendment. None of the
currently existing programs, however, are client-voluntary. Instead, of the 36 approved IOLTA
programs, 6 are attorney-mandatory and 30 are attorney-voluntary. IOLTA UPDATE, supra note
1. Mandatory programs require that all attorneys with trust accounts deposit all their clients'
nominal or short-term funds in an IOLTA account. Voluntary programs allow lawyers to choose
whether to participate in an IOLTA program. A lawyer who chooses to participate in a voluntary program, however, must deposit all nominal or short-term client funds into an IOLTA
account. The reason programs cannot be client-voluntary lies in the assignment of income doctrine and rulings of the Internal Revenue Service. The rulings state that if a client who deposited nominal or short-term funds could exercise any control over the placement or use of those
funds, the earnings would be deemed income to the client who, if qualified, could take a charitable deduction. Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981 C.B. 16. See England & Carlisle, supra note 1; Middlebrooks, The Interest on Trust Account Program,Mechanics of Its Operation, 56 FLA. B.J.
115 (1982). The adverse tax consequences, as well as the added administrative costs that would
result if IOLTA generated income was deemed income of the client, would make the program
impracticable. For fifth amendment purposes there is no difference between mandatory and
voluntary programs. In both, the client is compelled to participate. See Baker & Wood, supra
note 3, at 337-39.
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even if a property interest is assumed, no taking occurs. This paper
will begin with a brief look at the premise of IOLTA. Then, to provide a foundation for the discussion of both property and taking concepts, Section III will examine the evolution of laws concerning the
ability of individuals to place funds at interest and the ability of individuals to earn interest on bank deposits.
With this background established, the precise constitutional question will be defined and broken down into its two component parts,
the property issue and the taking issue. Section V will then examine
the property issue from two different perspectives. The first perspective explores whether -a definition of property, qua property, can be
usefully applied to the IOLTA controversy. The discussion concludes
the attempt to develop a definition of the word "property" for application to novel or unique circumstances fails absent an accepted normative theory of property. Thus, competing claims cannot be resolved by using a definitional exercise. The second perspective
examines the concept of property as embodied in the entitlement
doctrine of Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth 7 and concludes IOLTA works a constitutionally permissible change in the attorney-client trust relationship. Finally, after assuming the existence
of a property interest, Section VI explores whether IOLTA's impact
on that interest constitutes a taking. After briefly noting the historical evolution of taking law, current doctrine is explored in two ways.
First, several alternative approaches which scholars of various persuasions have suggested are identified and applied. Second, the Supreme Court's current multifactor analysis is examined and applied.
Section VI concludes, in the absence of. a per se rule, the complete
lack of injury suffered by clients negates any claim of taking.

II. THE IOLTA

PREMISE

Attorneys frequently receive funds from or on behalf of their clients. Prior to IOLTA, most of these funds were deposited in aggregated, interest-free checking accounts. 8 This procedure was adopted
because the typical deposit was either so small, or expected to be
held for so short a period of time, that it could not be invested productively for the benefit of the client. 9 The lack of income-earning
7. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
8. Demand deposits were used so that the attorney could return the client's money immediately upon request. MODEL CODE OF PROFESsIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(B)(4) (1980).
9. Not all client funds were held in demand accounts. Larger amounts, or amounts likely
to be held for long periods of time, were frequently placed in interest-bearing accounts. Placing
client money in an interest-bearing account was primarily a business decision by the attorney
and client, although the attorney's ethical and fiduciary responsibilities were implicated. ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348, 68 A.B.A. J. 1502 (1982)
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capacity resulted from four factors: (1) charges imposed by financial
institutions, particularly on small accounts; (2) administrative costs
incurred by the lawyer; (3) trust account requirements imposed by
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and, (4) banking law
restrictions.
Both attorneys and financial institutions incur a wide range of expenses in opening, disbursing, and closing client trust accounts. Financial institutions, in addition to the cost of interest paid, incur a
variety of administrative expenses for each depositor's account.
These costs lead to service charges, minimum balance requirements,
and other rules designed to diminish the cost of small accounts. 10
Lawyers incur an even wider range of costs in administering their
trust accounts." Given these basic costs, lawyers do not place their
clients' funds at interest unless the amount of the funds, or the time
period the funds are expected to be held, provides clear economic
justification for doing so.12 Instead, the normal focus is on safekeep[hereinafter cited as ABA Formal Op.3481.
10. Although the information is dated, one study placed the breakeven point for NOW
accounts at $1000.00. D. CRANE & M. RIEY, NOW ACCOUNTS: STRATEGIES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 80 (1978).
A $1000 breakeven point is consistent with current banking practice. The NCNB National
Bank of Tampa, for example, imposes a monthly maintenance fee of $5.00 and a transaction fee
of $.25 for each item for each NOW account, unless the account maintains a minimum balance
of $1000, or an average monthly balance of $2500. Affidavit from NCNB National Bank filed in
Glaeser v. The Florida Bar, No. 84-1345-Civ-T-13 (M.D. Fla. filed Oct. 11, 1984) (challenging
Florida's path-breaking 1981 IOLTA program on fifth amendment grounds).
11. These costs include:
1. The time needed, presumably that of the lawyer and client, to determine
whether investment is warranted.
2. The time necessary to obtain the client's social security or tax identification
number and other relevant information required for such investments.
3. The time necessary, probably of support staff, to open a separate account for the
client whose funds are to be invested.
4. The cost of internal law firm bookkeeping, on a periodic basis, to account for
client earnings.
5. The cost of preparing and furnishing IRS Form 1099, either by the financial
institution or the lawyer.
6. The time necessary to close the account, a task more complicated than the simple drawing of a check when client funds are kept in an aggregated, interest-free account.
REPORT TO THE BD. OF GOVERNORS, ABA TASK FORCE AND ADVISORY BD. ON INTEREST ON LAWYER
TRUST ACCOUNTS, 22-24 (July 1982) [hereinafter cited ABA TASK FORCE REPORT]. See also ABA

Formal Op. 348, supra note 9, at 1503. The possible future availability of sub-accounting may
reduce, but cannot eliminate, the administrative costs that banks and attorneys incur. Some
clients will also incur transaction costs if separate investment accounts are opened. IOLTA
proponents have not taken those costs into account.
12. ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 9, at 1503. Established by a time and motion study
which concluded the transaction costs incurred by attorneys in opening individual client trust
accounts equaled or exceeded $50.00, the Maryland IOLTA statute adopts a $50.00 safe harbor
guideline. MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 44(a)(2) (1982). See Machen, I-O-L-T-A "What Is It/How
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ing, accounting, and delivery on demand. 13
The lawyer's cost problem is compounded by the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. The expectation lawyers will absorb the transaction costs incurred is inherent in the Code's treatment of client trust accounts. Thus, the Code has been interpreted to
bar a lawyer from placing funds at interest and utilizing the interest
earned to defray the costs of administration.14 The Constitution,
however, does not impose such a bar. This approach is consistent
with the usual rule that a trustee is entitled to recover the expenses
of administering the trust.15 If customary trust rules are applied, a
client would have no legal claim to interest earned where the interest
earned did not exceed the administrative costs incurred. IOLTA is
premised on these rules.
In addition to economic realities, banking law restrictions in force
prior to 1981 generally barred the payment of interest on demand
accounts."' Accordingly, the typical client was neither penalized nor
benefited when his funds were deposited in an attorney's trust acDoes It Work?", 1983 Mn. B.J. 6, 9.
The table below shows the amount of principal and length of time necessary to generate
interest revenue in excess of the $50.00 Maryland benchmark:
Number of Days Required
Principal
to Generate $50.00 of Interest
Deposit
at 51/ % Compounded Daily
$

500
654
1,000
335
2,000
169
5,000
69
10,000
34
20,000
17
30,000
12
ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 24. Although little empirical evidence is currently
available, it seems likely that a very substantial portion of client trust funds will earn less than
the guideline amount.
13. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrrY DR 9-102 (1980). See Mathewson v.
Davis, 191 Ill.
391, 61 N.E. 68 (1901) (there is no duty to invest money held, but only to pay
over money to another entitled to receive it); ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 9 (lawyers must
neither misuse a client's funds nor impede prompt delivery).
14. An attorney cannot personally benefit from any earnings generated by his trust account, even to the extent of using the earnings to offset bank service charges. E.g., ABA Comm.
on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 545 (1962); ABA Comm. on Ethics &
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 991 (1967).
15. See 3 A. ScoTr, THE LAW OP TRusTs §§ 242, 244 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1983). In Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 802 (1975), the
court, while rejecting a fifth amendment challenge to a state statute requiring interest be paid
on mortgage escrows, held it would be improper to require a custodian of funds to absorb administrative costs.
16. See 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976). Some exceptions to this ban did exist, however, such as
in the northeastern states where NOW accounts were authorized as early as 1972. See infra
notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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count because the funds generally either came from an interest-free
account, were nominal, or were to be held for a short period of time.
Conversely, the commercial banks and attorneys benefited from this
system. The commercial bank received a significant economic benefit
from its interest-free use of clients' money. The individual attorney,
in turn, benefited by way of reduced cost banking services, lower cost
loans, and other free or reduced cost services. 17 The nationwide authorization of NOW accounts, effective December 31, 1980, however,
permitted lawyers participating in IOLTA programs to convert their
aggregated trust accounts from interest-free checking accounts to interest-paying NOW accounts. The economic benefits gained from
harnessing attorney trust funds were reallocated from financial institutions to the public. 8 Neither the client's nor the attorney's relationship to the attorney trust account is altered because the funds
are deposited in an IOLTA account. The only difference is that an
unused economic resource is put to work in the public interest at no
cost to either attorney or client. 9 An understanding of the nature of
the client's right in the interest earned by his funds calls for a more
17. The use of IOLTA accounts prevents attorneys from benefiting from their trust accounts. Banks considered the interest-free trust account a "compensating balance" for which
they extended to lawyers a variety of indirect benefits. The ethical propriety of using a trust
account for such purposes is doubtful, but has never been directly addressed by an A.B.A.
Ethics Opinion, or by a state decision. Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Ethics Op. 80-57 (1980) opined
that a law firm could ethically agree to maintain all its accounts, including its trust account, in
a particular bank in return for lower cost bank services, so long as the firm did not compromise
its obligation to invest client monies for the benefit of the client where appropriate. But cf.
Meyer v. Meyer, 106 Miss. 638, 64 So. 420 (1914), holding that where a trustee deposited trust
funds in a bank, pursuant to an agreement that in return for the deposit the bank would make
an interest-free loan to the trustee, the trustee was to be surcharged with the amount of interest he saved.
18. The impact of the reallocation is limited by the realities of banking industry competition. Before NOW accounts, only commercial banks (and saving banks), but not savings and
loan associations, could offer checking accounts. Federal law barred the payment of interest on
checking accounts, thereby granting commercial banks the interest-free use of depositors'
funds. The shifting of a lawyer's trust account from a demand account to a NOW account
causes the commercial bank to incur interest expense it was not previously paying. That financial impact is tempered by the competition from savings and loan associations, which expect to
pay interest on all their deposits. To savings and loan associations, the advent of NOW accounts provides a way for them to compete with commercial banks in attracting money previously kept in demand accounts. The impact on commercial banks produced by changes in the
banking industry is substantial; IOLTA plays a very small role.
19. IOLTA may serve one other useful purpose. It reminds attorneys that funds which
can be productively invested for the benefit of the client should be so invested. Particularly in
states where participation in IOLTA is mandatory for all attorneys (Arizona, California, Iowa,
Minnesota, Ohio and Washington, IOLTA UPDATE, supra note 1), attorneys must determine
whether to invest client funds for the benefit of the client or deposit the funds in the IOLTA
account. It is likely that because attorneys are forced to consider the investment potential of all
client funds they hold, more funds will be invested. In voluntary states, the impact will likely
be less.
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in-depth look at the history of interest.
HI.

THE RIGHT OF A FUND TO EARN INTEREST INCOME

This section traces the historical development of an individual's
ability to place funds at interest. The tracing serves four broad purposes. First, it identifies the descriptive elements that can be utilized
as part of a definitional exercise which attempts to answer the
threshold property question. Second, it identifies the positive rules of
law necessary to apply the "reliance and expectation" theory developed in Roth for determining the existence of a legitimate claim of
entitlement. Third, it furnishes the foundation for assessing the validity of the change in attorney trust accounting law implicit in
IOLTA. Finally, it provides a factual basis for applying the relevant
criteria of the multifactor balancing test.
The intuitive claim of IOLTA opponents cannot be dismissed as
groundless. The general rule is that interest becomes part of the invested fund which produced the income. Thus, the earnings of a fund
are usually deemed a mere incident of ownership of the fund itself so
that an eminent domain provision "applies to the earnings in the
same manner, and with the same force, as it applies to the principal.,,1o This rule is frequently applied in situations where private
funds are entrusted to public officials. 21 For example, funds deposited
20. McMillan v. Robeson County, 262 N.C. 413, 417, 137 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1964). The
clearest expression of the duty to distribute occurs in McMillan, where the court clerk was
required to distribute $9,842.82 in interest to 1368 account holders, several of whose accounts
contained less than one dollar in principal and few of whose accounts contained substantial
sums. In ordering distribution, the court said: "It is manifest from the foregoing summary that
allocation of the earnings which have occurred on the funds paid to the Clerk will presentf
problems in accounting, but that fact does not justify depriving the owners of the funds of their
share of the earnings." Id. at 415, 137 S.E.2d at 108.
When IOLTA was first proposed in North Carolina, the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court declined to approve, relying on McMillan, Webb's, and the argument that
IOLTA would interfere with the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client. Letter from
Joseph Branch, Chief Justice, North Carolina Supreme Court, to Mr. John W. Campbell, President, North Carolina State Bar (Apr. 13, 1982). Thereafter, the Bar modified its proposal by
requiring notice to the client that his funds would be deposited in an IOLTA account, although
the client was not given a veto power over his lawyer's decision, and on June 23, 1983, the Chief
Justice approved the proposal.
21. The usual rule is set forth in Bordy v. Smith, 150 Neb. 272, 278, 34 N.W.2d 331, 335
(1948), to wit:
The clerk suggests that a decision to the effect that the interest money belongs to the
beneficial owners would present serious difficulties in determining who are such owners
and in computing how much each would be entitled to receive. Such difficulties, if actually present, would be of no benefit to the clerk because the interest goes with the principal to the owners thereof and no difficulty in determining such owners and their proportionate share thereof would entitle the clerk to keep such funds.
Id. See Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 257 (1949).
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in court, such as in interpleader actions, should be invested where
feasible.2 2 The income generated, if any, belongs to the party adjudged entitled to the fund.23 Conversely, if no interest is actually
earned, the prevailing party is not entitled to recover interest as part
24
of its judgment.
The rule that earnings follow principal does not, however, generally place the holder of a fund under a duty to invest the money on
the owner's behalf. 25 As between private parties, such as when mortgage escrows for taxes and insurance are involved, the majority view
holds the mortgagee need not pay interest 26 unless an applicable statute requires otherwise. A lawyer is usually under no duty to invest
the ordinary client trust account deposit because its short-term nature makes such action impractical.28 If the fund does earn interest,
however, that interest "is always said to be an accretion to or an increment to the fund earning it and unless lawfully separated from the
fund"2 it becomes a part of the principal.30 Whether IOLTA "lawfully separates" interest from principal is, of course, the question
under discussion. To answer this question, scrutiny of the historic
right to interest is useful.
An essential element of property is said to be the "right to income" produced as a result of the property's use. It is not always
true, however, that an essential characteristic of property ownership
is the legal ability to earn income where the income takes the form of
interest.3 1 At common law, in fact, it was unlawful to recover interest
22. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. King, 308 F. Supp. 1143 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
23. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. at 155; James Talcott, Inc. v.
Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); First Constr.
Co. v. Tri-South Mortg. Investors, 308 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981).
24. Nebben v. Kosmalski, 307 Minn. 211, 239 N.W.2d 234 (1976).
25. Bassett v. Kinney, 24 Conn. 267 (1855); Everglade Cypress Co. v. Tunnicliffe, 107 Fla.
675, 148 So. 192 (1933); Clay v. McCabe, 56 A.D.2d 747, 392 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1977). Where the
holder is a trustee, the trust property should be made productive where feasible. 2 A. Scorr,
supra note 15, § 181.
26. Brooks v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 113 Ariz. 169, 548 P.2d 1166 (1976); Kronisch v. Howard
Say. Inst., 161 N.J. Super. 592, 392 A.2d 178 (App. Div. 1978). Contra Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Or. 533, 577 P.2d 477, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051
(1978).
27. Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Lefkowitz, 390 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 802
(1975).
28.

ABA Formal Op. 348, supra note 9.

29. Heck & Paetow Claim Serv. v. Heck, 93 Wis. 2d 349, 357, 286 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1980).
30. See, e.g., Alfred v. Esser, 91 Colo. 466, 15 P.2d 714 (1932); Kiernan v. Cleland, 47
Idaho 200, 273 P. 938 (1929); Toop v. Palmer, 108 Neb. 850, 189 N.W. 394 (1922); Southern Or.
Co. v. Gage, 100 Or. 424, 197 P. 276 (1921); Des Moines Mut. Hail & Cyclone Ins. Ass'n v.
Steen, 43 N.D. 298, 175 N.W. 195 (1919). The generality of this rule did not, however, bar
implementation of IOLTA programs in Idaho, Nebraska, Oregon and Colorado.
31. The terms interest and usury were generally considered synonymous until the eighteenth century. E. JOHNSON, AMERICAN ECONoMic THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 213
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on money loaned.3 2 The prohibition ascribed to the common law is
attributable to a long history of religious and moral debate, only a
small part of which will be traced here.3 3 This common law bar
stemmed from the biblical prohibition found in Deuteronomy that
"thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money,
usury of victuals, usury of anything that is lent upon usury."3 4 The
biblical prohibition furnished fertile grounds for moral debate in medieval Europe. The Church condemned usury in any form.35 Nevertheless, lending at interest has been present throughout recorded history.3 6 At the time of the German Reformation, "the radical
preachers declared interest charges, usury, and in some cases even
private property, to be anti-Mosaical and unchristian. 3 7 The conservatives, led by Luther, argued that Mosaic law was obsolete and
that the New Testament was not meant to govern civil affairs. Usury,
under this theory, was neither prohibited nor permitted; it was simply no business of the Church. Regulation of interest was solely a
matter for the civil government.3
Overcoming religiously based opposition to usury was vital if the
newly emerging capitalist system was to continue to develop.3 9 Calvin
was the first to "exploit the ambivalence of the Deuteronomic passage" to establish that lending at interest was proper.40 His leadership paved the way for "merchants, lawyers, and other spokesmen of
the business community" to take the initiative in removing the burdensome medieval doctrine of usury.41 By 1650, the "traditionalist
42
forces had been thoroughly routed in Protestant lands.'
England first allowed lending at interest in 1545 at the rate of ten
percent.43 In the face of a storm of moral and religious opposition,"
(1961). The terms will be used interchangeably throughout this section.
32. National Bank v. Mechanics' Nat'l Bank, 94 U.S. (4 Otto.) 437 (1877).
33. For a more extensive development of the topic, see J. NOONAN, JR., Tim SCHOLASTIC
ANALYSIS OF USURY (1957); F. RYAN, USURY AND USURY LAws (1924); T. WILSON, A DISCOURSE
UPON UsuRY (1963) (first published in 1572, with an historical introduction by R.H. Tawney).
34. Deuteronomy 23:19 (King James). The earliest known written usury law is contained
in the Hammurabi Code, dating to 1750 B.C. Special Project, Interest Rates and the Law: A
History of Usury, 1981 ARiz. ST. L.J. 61, 66-67 [hereinafter cited as InterestRates]. The Code is
said to have permitted interest. at 20% on loans of silver and 33% on loans of grain. Id.
35. B. NELsoN, THE IDEA OF USURY, FRom TRIBAL BROTHERHOOD TO UNIVEMSAL
OTHERHOOD

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

(1949).

Interest Rates, supra note 34, at 73.
B. NELSON, supra note 35, at xix.
Id.
Id. at xx.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 95.
A Bill Against Usury, 37 Hen. 8, ch. 9 (1545).
Interest Rates, supra note 34, at 81.
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the authorization was repealed seven years later.4 5 This prohibition
lasted only eighteen years. In 1570, the taking of interest was legalized 46 and was never again banned. Henceforth, the issue would not
be whether interest could be charged, but rather how much could be
charged.
Although religious thought no longer abhored usury, it never
abandoned the proposition that rates of interest should be controlled
to prevent exploitation. Luther declared that "interest which does
not exceed 4 or 5 percent is not immoral. ' 47 Calvin argued that taking interest was not improper so long as the rate was not oppressive.4 8 Interest rates were regulated downward in 1624," 9 1660,50 and
again in 1713. 51 While John Locke, writing in 1691, advocated free
trade in money, he never doubted the power of the state to regulate
the rate. In fact, he supported legal limits to protect the inexperienced against "extortion and oppression. ' ' 52 Regulation continued to
be the rule, although opposed by Bentham, 53 Blackstone54 and
45. 5 & 6 Edw. 6, ch. 20 (1552).
46. An Act Against Usury, 13 Eliz. 1, ch. 8 (1570).
47. Interest Rates, supra note 34, at 78.
48. Id. at 78-79.
49. An Act Against Usury, 21 Jac. 1, ch. 17 (1623) (reducing the rate to 8%).
50. An Act for the Refraining the Taking of Excessive Usury, 12 Car. 2, ch. 13 (1660)
(reducing the rate to 6%).
51. An Act to Reduce the Rate of Interest Without Any Prejudice to Parliamentary Securities, 12 Anne., stat. 2 ch. 16 (1713) (reducing the rate to 5%).
52. F. RYAN, supra note 33, at 47. Locke insisted:
[Tihat the
interest by
perjury,. .
the lazy in

B.

"price of the hire of money" cannot be regulated, that lowering the rate of
law would destroy trade, ruin "widows and orphans," and inspire general
. would enrich only bankers, [who] . . . with the money of the "ignorant and
their hands . . . are always skillful enough to get interest above the legal."

NELSON, supra note 35, at 98.

53.
THAM

Bentham, Letters in Defense of Usury (1781), reprinted in 3 WORKS OF JEREMY BEN1-29 (J. Bowring ed., reprint 1962). Bentham said:

In a word, the proposition I have been accustomed to lay down to myself on this subject
is the following one, viz. that no man of ripe years and of sound mind, acting freely, and
with his eyes open, ought to be hindered with a view to his advantage, from making
such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he sees fit: nor (what is a necessary
consequence) anybody hindered from supplying him, upon any terms he thinks proper
to accede to.
Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Bentham also argued the laws regulating interest rates could do
nothing but cause mischief. Id., vol. VI, at 9. For a fuller development of Bentham's position,
see Interest Rates, supra note 34, at 83-84.
54. Blackstone argued that the total prohibition of usury was the work of the "Dark
Ages," the time of "Monkish superstitutions and civil tyranny," when "commerce was at its
lowest ebb." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *107-08, quoted in B. NELSON, supra note 35, at
108.
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685

55

The tradition of interest rate regulation carried over to colonial
America.5 6 By the eighteenth century, all of the colonies had adopted
laws regulating interest rates.5 Following the Revolution, the new
states used these laws as models.5 8 Regulation, in one form or an-

other, has continued to be the general pattern to date.
The inherited history of usury quickly led American courts to

conclude that the "right to recover interest upon the loan or
forebearance of money" was purely statutory. 5 State courts have
continued to adhere to that view, 0 although the federal rule, in the
absence of statute, permits the recovery of interest as the dictates of
equity require.6 1 Between private parties, interest is purely a matter
of contract.6 2 Indeed, in the absence of statute or contract, banks
have no obligation to pay interest on deposits.63
While the rules authorizing both loans at interest and the recovery of interest in judicial proceedings have constantly expanded, until
recently the same could not be said of the rules authorizing interest
on bank deposits. The modern institution of banking can be traced to
the founding of the Bank of England in 1694." From the earliest period, the regulation of banking activities was deemed of utmost
55.

H. SPIEGEL, THE GROWTH OF EcONoMIc THouGHT 256 (1983). Not until 1854, long after

the American Revolution, did England repeal its usury laws. Usury Law Repeal Act, 1854, 17 &
18 Vict., ch. 90.
56. The usury question was no longer a moral issue to the American colonists because the
last absolute prohibition against usury was removed during the reign of Elizabeth in 1571. E
JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 213-19.
57. Interest Rates, supra note 34, at 85.
58. Every state regulated interest rates by the middle of the nineteenth century. Id.
59. Frazer, Executor v. Boss, 66 Ind. 1 (1879).
60. See, e.g., Cobb v. Stratton's Estate, 56 Colo. 278, 138 P. 35 (1913); City of Detroit v.
Detroit Police Officers, 408 Mich. 410, 294 N.W.2d 68 (1980); McManus v. Burrows, 280 Mo.
327, 217 S.W. 512 (1919). For a contrary view, see Coleman v. Commins, 77 Cal. 548, 20 P. 77
(1888), where the Court reversed the rule and held that the bar of usury was solely statutory.
Therefore, in the absence of statute, any rate, no matter how high, was lawful.
61. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371 (1947); Billings v. United States, 232
U.S. 261 (1914); Young v. Godbe, 82 U.S. (15 Wall) 562 (1873). Although no statute is required
where the United States seeks recovery, the converse is not true. Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d
918 (3d Cir. 1977).
62. Lakefront Realty Corp. v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 167 N.E.2d 236 (1960).
63. Jones v. Mallory, 22 Conn. 386 (1853). See 5A MICHc ON BANKS AND BANKING § 94
(1973 & Supp. 1983). The positive law may also deny recovery, even as to pre-existing contractual agreements, because it is only by way of positive law that interest may be recovered. A law
of that nature will not be deemed to impair a contract, nor will it be considered a deprivation of
property. E.g., Missouri & Arkansas Lumber & Mining Co. v. Greenwood Dist. of Sebastian
County, Ark., 249 U.S. 170 (1919); Morley v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 146 U.S. 162 (1892).
Harmanson v. Wilson, 11 F. Cas. 541 (1877), held that the long history of interest rate regulation authorized the legislature to freely modify, as it deemed in the public interest, laws relating to the recovery of interest on a debt.
64. J. KNOX, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNrrTE STATES 4 (1900).
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importance.6 5
Banking developed slowly in colonial America. There were no
banks as we know them today prior to 1780.66 Unlike the Bank of
England, a central bank with important commercial functions and
which paid interest on deposits from the beginning, 7 the early American banks were established for the purpose of providing "safe depositories for the funds of capitalists."' 8 Beginning in 1781, however,
banks in the modern sense were established in ever increasing numbers.6 9 By 1786, bank deposits played an important role in the economy.70 Still, the suggestion in 1810 that the First Bank of the United
States pay interest on government deposits was considered a radical
departure. 71 Even as late as 1834, it was thought the purpose of making a bank deposit was for safekeeping.72
Although the terminology differed, the earliest banks accepted
65. Id.
66. B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA. FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL
WAR 4 (1957). Hammond describes early banking:
In the 18th century American "banks" were known in three different senses. First, the
word was used of corporate institutions - the Bank of England, for example - of
which, however, there were none in America till 1782. Second, it was used of an issue of
bills of credit by a colonial government: Rhode Island, for example, might emit "a bank
of L40,000." This use became obsolete before the century ended. Third, it was used of an
association of private persons who issued their own bills of credit.
Id. Checking accounts were non-existent. Id. at 9-10.
67. J. KNOX, supra note 64, at 4.
68. I F. REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING: MEN AND IDEAS 13-14 (Johnson
Reprint 1968). Redlich notes that, for the most part, banks did not charge a fee for this service,
although for a few years between 1784 and 1815 The Massachusetts Bank did charge depositors
a small fee payable at withdrawal. Id. at 15. Prior to 1815, only one bank paid interest on
deposits. Redlich notes, "[iut would hardly have occurred to the average bank director to pay
such interest. Providing a safe place of deposit for capitalists was considered one of the main
functions of banks, and the question was whether or not banks should charge a fee for such
service." Id. at 52.
69. B. HAMMOND, supra note 66, at 71-72. By 1800, 29 banks were in existence. Id. at 144.
The number steadily increased. In 1811, there were 88 banks and by 1816 there were 246 banks.

C.

GOLEMBE

& D.

HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING

4 (1981). All the existing banks

were state-chartered, the federal government not yet having created the dual banking system
we know today.
70. B. HAMMOND, supra note 66, at 81 (interest was not paid on deposits). See I F. REDLICH, supra note 68, at 14. The payment of interest on deposits was first introduced in 1807 by
the Farmers' Bank of Maryland. It paid 4% on deposits held for at least six months and 3% on
demand deposits. Farmers' Bank was the exception; most banks did not pay interest prior to
1825. J. KNOX, supra note 64, at 480. See also D. DEWEY, STATE BANKING BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR
215 (1910) (for the proposition that a bank could not refuse to pay interest on government
deposits without violating their charter); I E. KEYES, A HISTORY OF SAVINGS BANKS IN THE
UNITED STATES, FROM THEIR INCEPTION IN 1816 DOWN TO 1874 328 (1876) (for the belief that
allowing interest on money deposited would be a great public accommodation and benefit).
71. I F. REDLICH, supra note 68, at 14 n.103.
72. Id. at 13 n.99.
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both time and demand deposits. In the east coast commercial centers,
checks were in common usage before 1800.73 By 1816, demand deposits accounted for nearly half of all deposits, a figure which continued
to pay interest on
to rise.7 4 Ten years later it was .common for1 banks
5
time deposits, but not on demand deposits.

As the banking industry evolved, competition for deposits grew.
To attract new deposits, the payment of interest on demand deposits
became widespread.7 e Due to the financial panic of 1857, however,
forty-two New York City banks agreed among themselves to cease
paying interest.17 Banks outside of New York City soon followed
suit." The pressure of new competition after the Civil War, however,
resulted in the resumption of interest payments.7 9 By 1884, the payment of interest on demand deposits had become almost universal
among banks.8 0
Throughout this developmental period, banking was heavily regulated."' The federal government's involvement in banking began with
73. Id. at 15.
74. Id. at 50.
75. Id. at 53.
76. Id. vol. 1, at 6. Before 1840, it was unusual for interest to be paid on demand deposits
of individuals, although interest was often paid on demand deposits of other banks, corporations, and governmental entities. Id. at 53. Today, of course, the rule is reversed. See infra note
97.
77. I F. REDLICH, supra note 68, at 7. By 1860, virtually all New York City banks had
stopped paying interest on deposits. A. Cox, REGULATION OF INTEREST RATES ON BANK DEPosrrs
3 (1966).
78. I F. REDLICH, supra note 68, at 7.
79. Id.
80. J. KNox. supra note 64, at 187. Certificates of deposit were in common usage. Early
withdrawal resulted in the forfeiture of all interest. Id. Connecticut, in 1854, adopted the first
law limiting the amount of interest that could be paid on deposits. Although state regulation
was pervasive, it was not, in general, concerned with whether, or how much, interest should be
paid on deposits. A. Cox, supra note 77, at 2. Before 1863, there were no nationally chartered
banks other than the First and Second Banks of the United States. Regulation, therefore, was
almost entirely a matter of state law. C. GOLEmmE & D. HOLLAND, supra note 69, at 3.
81. The early years of the republic are often spoken of as if the era were one of laissez
faire in which governmental authority refrained from interference in business and benevolently left it a free field. Nothing of the sort was true of banking. Legislators hesitated
about the kinds of conditions under which banking should be permitted but never about
the propriety and need for imposing conditions. To begin with, Hamilton and the Federalists closely restricted banking as a quasi-state monopoly at a time when the opposition
would have permitted no banking at all. The issue was between prohibition and state
control, with no thought of free enterprise .... The impression was general that the
exercise of the banking function without express authorization from the sovereign power
was improper, if not impractical, and that legislatures had the obligation to legislate for
it with all the detail they chose.
B. HAMMoND, supra note 66, at 185-86. In 1852, there were no banks in the states of Arkansas,
California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, and Texas, then constituting 7 out of 31 states, or in the
territories of Minnesota and Oregon, as well as the District of Columbia. Id. at 605. See also G.
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the creation of the First Bank of the United States in 1791 and the
later establishment of the Second Bank in 1816.82 After the demise of
the Second Bank in 1836, the federal government did not actively
return to banking until adoption of the National Currency Act of
1863.83 This Act, for the first time, made provisions for the federal
chartering of banks.8 4 A year later, the National Bank Act of 1864
revised the chartering authority and created a federal regulatory authority, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. s5 Like their
state counterparts, the creators of the national banking system were
not concerned with whether interest should be paid on deposits."6
The National Bank Act of 1864 did not even address the issue. Periodically, after financial crises in 1873, 1884, 1893 and during World
War One, proposals to eliminate interest on deposits were made, but
never adopted.8 7
The bank failures of the Great Depression resulted in a complete
overhaul of banking law and far more extensive federal regulation.
Section 11(b) of the Banking Act of 1933 barred commercial banks
from paying interest on demand deposits and authorized the Federal
Reserve Board to limit, by regulation, the rate of interest payable on
time and savings deposits.88 This regulatory scheme, adopted in 1933,
BARNETT, STATE BANK AND TRUST COMPANIES SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE NATIONAL BANK Acr

144-81 (National Monetary Commission 1911) (A.M. Kelley reprint 1969) (for a discussion of
the development of state bank supervision); C. GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, supra note 69, at 3 (for
the premise that banks are subject to the oldest and most pervasive system of regulation with
the states, as opposed to federal government, almost completely regulating banking for the first
75 years); W. SUMNER, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES (1896) (for a complete
history of banking in the United States from 1630 to 1895).

82. C.

GOLEMBE

& D.

HOLLAND,

supra note 69, at 3.

83. 12 Stat. 665 (1863).
84. C. GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, supra note 69, at 5.
85. 13 Stat. 99 (1864). The Act was originally entitled "An Act to provide a National
Currency, secured by a Pledge of United States Bonds, and to provide for the Circulation and
Redemption thereof." Id. The Act was retitled in 1874. 18 Stat. 123. See Levin, In Search of
the National Bank Act, 97 BANKING L.J. 741, 742-43 (1980).
86. A. Cox, supra note 77, at. 4.
87. Id. at 4-9.
88. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 11(b), Pub. L. No. 66, 48 Stat. 181 (1933). That section,
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976), provided in relevant part that: "No member bank shall,
directly or indirectly, by any device whatsoever, pay any interest on any deposit which is payable on demand." The Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 305, 49 Stat. 702 (1935), authorized the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.) to regulate interest rates of insured, nonmember banks. Other legislation had the effect of regulating interest rates for savings and loan
associations and other types of financial institutions. Both the Federal Reserve Board, in its
Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1984), and the F.D.I.C. have maintained interest rate regulations for over forty years. In Steingut v. Guaranty Trust Co., 161 F.2d 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 753, 807 (1947), the court held that § 11(b) required financial institutions to
stop paying interest on pre-1933 demand deposits, even where the interest was being paid pursuant to an express contract between the bank and the depositor.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 3
1984]

INTEREST OF LAWYERS' TRUST ACCOUNTS

remained relatively unchanged for forty years."'
The new regulatory scheme severely limited the ability of depositors to earn interest. Some slippage was inevitable, however, because
of definitional problems associated with the three types of available
accounts, "demand," "time" and "savings." No depositor was entitled
to interest on a demand account. Savings deposits, defined as money
belonging to individuals or to non-profit institutions operated for religious, charitable or similar purposes left on deposit thirty days or
more, were permitted to earn interest. Corporate funds could earn
interest only if placed in time deposits.9 0 Efforts to circumvent interest limitations were common.9 1 The real revolution, however, was yet
to come.
In June of 1972, the Consumers Savings Bank of Worcester, Massachusetts, offered the first savings accounts that permitted a "Negotiable Order of Withdrawal" (NOW accounts).9 2 Three months later,
similar accounts were offered in New Hampshire.93 Congress quickly
confirmed the authority of financial institutions in those two states to
89. The federal government has the power to regulate all aspects of the banking industry.
E.g., Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1949); Dillingham v. McLaughlin, 264 U.S. 370 (1924);
Cook County Nat'l Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445 (1882). The government's power to
control interest rates has never been directly challenged. The early case of Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. (4 Otto.) 113 (1877), which upheld the regulation of rates charged by warehousemen as a
valid exercise of the police power, adequately disposes of any such attack. United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 329 (1963), assumed, without discussion, the validity of
§ 11(b). Lower court decisions make the same assumption. For example, Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Sumner Fin. Corp., 451 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1971), upheld, without analysis or discussion, F.D.I.C. regulations limiting interest rates and controlling interest rate advertising.
Gearheart v. Federal Reserve Bank, 516 F.2d 353 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 927 (1975),
upheld the interest rate differential of Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217.7, dependent on the size
of a certificate of deposit. Frouge Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat'l Ass'n), 426 F. Supp.
794 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), held that it was improper for a bank to pay interest on a business checking account. The states have similarly broad regulatory powers. Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
219 U.S. 104 (1911), upheld, against a fifth amendment taking claim, a state law requiring
banks to contribute to a "Depositors' Guaranty Fund," a precursor of the F.D.I.C. The Court so
held, at least in part, on the basis that because the state could take the entire business of
banking under its control it surely could regulate a lesser matter. Id. at 113. State court decisions are similar. See, e.g., Holland v. Nakdimen, 177 Ark. 920, 9 S.W.2d 307 (1928) (upholding
a limitation of 4% on interest payments on deposits); Hoefflier v. American Sav. Bank, 47
N.Y.S.2d 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Special Term), aff'd, 268 A.D. 766, 50 N.Y.S.2d 166 (N.Y. App.
Div.), appeal denied, 293 N.Y. 935 (1944) (sustaining a law barring savings banks from paying
interest on deposits in excess of $7,500.00).
90. Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, Annual Report 64 (1935). Current regulation is found at 12 C.F.R. § 217.135 (1984). See A. Cox, supra note 77, at 26-27.
91. A. Cox, supra note 77, at 26.
92. D. CRANE & M. Ru.EY, supra note 10, at 3. These "check-equivalent" devices were
quickly upheld by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Consumers Say. Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, 361 Mass. 717, 282 N.E.2d 416 (1972).
93. D. CRANE & M. RILEY, supra note 10, at 3.
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offer NOW accounts. 94 Three years later, the authorization was extended to all six New England states.9 5 The popularity of what, to
the general public, was simply an interest paying checking account
spread quickly and became a nationwide phenomenon as of December 31, 1980.96 NOW accounts are not available to all depositors. Instead, NOW accounts must consist "solely of funds in which the entire beneficial interest is held by one or more individuals or by an
organization which is operated primarily for religious, philanthropic,
charitable, educational, or other similar purposes and which is not
operated for profit," or of funds belonging to public entities.9 7 NOW
94. Pub. L. No. 93-100, § 2, 87 Stat. 342 (1973) (repealed 1980). Financial institutions in
other states were barred from allowing "the owner of a deposit or account on which interest or
dividends are paid to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instruments for the purpose of making transfers to third parties." Id.
95. Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 2, 90 Stat. 197 (1976), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1982).
New York was added in 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XIII, § 1301, 92 Stat. 3712 (1978),
amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1982), and New Jersey in 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-161, tit. I,
§ 106, 93 Stat. 1235 (1979), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1982).
96. The Consumer Checking Account Equity Act of 1980, Title III of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 303, 94 Stat.
146 (1980), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1982). Other provisions of the Act are codified
primarily at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3524 (1982). Section 12 U.S.C. § 3502(a) (1982), delegates to a
Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee (D.I.D.C.) the authority to "prescribe rules
governing the payment of interest . . . and the establishment of classes of accounts." Section
204, 12 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1982), states that limitations will cease as soon as economic conditions render it feasible, but not later than March 31, 1986. In 1982, the Thrift Institutions
Restructuring Act, Title III of the Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-320, § 327, 96 Stat. 1501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503(c) (1982)), authorized financial
institutions to compete with the interest rates offered by money market mutual funds. The
D.I.D.C. then created the Money Market Deposit Account (M.M.D.A.). 47 Fed. Reg. 53710
(Nov. 29, 1982). M.M.D.A.'s are available to all depositors. Preauthorized transfers are limited
to a maximum of six per month, however, three of which can be by "check, draft or similar
device drawn by the depositor to third parties." 12 C.F.R. § 1204.122 (1984). The development
of the M.M.D.A. resulted in the creation of the Super NOW account, pursuant to the D.I.D.C.'s
authority to create classes of accounts, granted by § 203(a). See 47 Fed. Reg. 56320 (Dec. 16,
1982), cited in 12 C.F.R. § 1204.122 (1984). The NOW account interest rate is limited to 51/ %.
Super NOW accounts are identical to NOW accounts, except for an unregulated interest rate in
return for opening and average balance requirements. 12 C.F.R. § 1204.108 (1984).
97. 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2) (1982). The categories of depositors eligible to hold NOW and
Super NOW accounts include:
1. Individuals, both privately and as sole proprietors.
2. Fiduciaries, provided the entire beneficial interest belongs to an individual.
3. Pension funds, escrow accounts, security deposits, and the like, provided the entire beneficial interest belongs to an individual.
4. Nonprofit organizations operated primarily for religious, philanthropic, charitable, educational or other similar purposes.
5. Organizations described in section 501(c)(3) through (13) and (19) of the Internal Revenue Code.
6. Homeowners and condominium owners associations.
7. Governmental entities.
Ineligible categories of depositors include:
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accounts furnish the only basis for interest-paying checking accounts.
NOW account ownership restrictions, however, bar all profit-making
clients, other than sole proprietors, from utilizing NOW accounts.
In short, both economic and banking barriers prevent a client's
nominal or short-term deposits from being made productive for the
client. The first barrier, the transaction costs incurred by attorneys
and financial institutions, was noted earlier.9 8 The second barrier,
considered in this section, consists of the long history of restrictions
on the ability of bank customers to earn interest on checking accounts. This barrier includes the current NOW account ownership restrictions, which prevent all profit-making clients, other than sole
proprietors, from utilizing NOW accounts. The unique character of
the IOLTA program rests in part on its ability to overcome both barriers. The economic barrier is overcome because the aggregate, as an
aggregate, can produce income net of expenses. Additionally, by providing that income produced by a NOW account be paid to a nonprofit charitable corporation or a public entity, the banking barrier is
overcome. 99 Therefore, it is accurate to say that without IOLTA there
would be no interest income in the first place.
1. All organizations, of whatever form, operated for profit, including corporations,
partnerships, associations, business trusts, etc.
2. Credit unions.
3. Mutual insurance companies.
4. Crop financing organizations.
5. Political organizations.
6. Prepaid legal services plans.
12 C.F.R. § 217.157 (1984). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's similar regulation for
insured banks is found at id. § 329.103; the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's for savings and
loan associations at id. § 526.1(a)(1). The history of the restriction is discussed in Schley, Restrictions on Ownership on NOW Accounts, 99 BANKING L.J. 196, 201-06 (1982). Corporations
can earn interest on their bank deposits if they do not use negotiable instruments as the
method of withdrawal. Id. Otero Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 665 F.2d 279
(10th Cir. 1981), prohibited a savings and loan association from evading NOW account ownership restrictions by using a "check-in" account, which consisted of an interest bearing savings
account and a zero balance checking account into which funds were transferred to cover checks
as presented. In American Bankers Ass'n v. Connell, 686 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court
struck down regulations which authorized Automatic Fund Transfer schemes designed to
achieve the same end, as being an "indirect device" to pay interest on demand deposits, and
thus barred by 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1976). Congress then amended the section to permit automatic withdrawal accounts so long as the deposits consist "only of funds in which the entire
beneficial interest is held by one or more individuals." Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-191,
tit. I, § 101(a), 93 Stat. 1233 (1979), effective from Dec. 31, 1979 to Mar. 31, 1980, extended by
The Consumer Checking Account Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. III, § 302(a), 94 Stat.
145, 145-46 (1980).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 8-15.
99. Because the recipient of the IOLTA-generated interest is considered the beneficial
owner, the use of NOW accounts by the law firm is permissible. Middlebrooks, The Interest on
Trust Accounts Program, Mechanics of Its Operation, 56 FLA. B.J. 115 (1982).
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IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE

Moving past rhetoric to a definition of the precise fifth amendment issues IOLTA raises is difficult. Such an analysis requires an
examination of two of the four core concepts of the takings clause.' 00
The threshold issue is whether IOLTA deprives a client of any
"property." If that questior is answered affirmatively, the second issue, whether the client's property is "taken" as that term is understood in fifth amendment jurisprudence, must be examined. Unfortunately, neither proponents nor critics of IOLTA have engaged in a
rigorous and searching examination of the fifth amendment issues at
stake. This article's discussion of the policies and doctrine underlying
the issues serves to highlight the difficulty in resolving the conflict.
Twenty-five state supreme courts have adopted IOLTA programs
without formal opinion. 0 1 Four state supreme courts have refused to
100. "Public use" and "just compensation" limitations imposed by the fifth amendment
are not implicated. Even IOLTA's harshest critics concede that providing legal services to the
poor is a "public use" within the meaning of the taking clause. Baker & Wood, supra note 3, at
365. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984), confirms that the police power
and the fifth amendment's public use limitation are coextensive. "Just compensation," the
measure of damages, is applicable only if IOLTA is a taking. Deciding that IOLTA is a taking
ends the program because no IOLTA program can provide for just compensation.
101. IOLTA UPDATE, supra note 1. In five states, IOLTA programs have been established
by legislation: California, The Funds for the Provision of Legal Services to the Indigent Act,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (West 1981); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, §§ 4445.0 (1982); New York, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 497 (McKinney 1983); Connecticut, 1984 Conn. Acts
84-537 (Reg. Sess.); Ohio, Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 219, effective Jan. 8, 1985. Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984), appeal denied,
No. 4 Civ. 31635 (Cal. May 2, 1985), decided after completion of this article, rejected all parts
of an attack on California's mandatory IOLTA program. The plaintiffs in that action alleged
that the California program violated the fifth amendment's taking clause, was void for vagueness because it failed to adequately specify how to determine whether a client's funds were
nominal or short-term, violated the equal protection clause because clients without trust fund
deposits did not have to participate in financing legal aid, and worked a denial of the right to
counsel. In rejecting the taking claim, the court emphasized the total lack of loss to the client,
cited the statement in Hooker v. Burr, 194 U.S. 415, 419 (1904), that if a claimant is "not
injured to the extent of a penny. . ., his abstract rights are unimportant." Id., slip. op. at 13,
and held that "[s]o long as the principal is secure, not diminished and is not economically
capable of generating net income through deposits or investments legally available for lawyers'
trust funds . . ." there is no taking. Id. slip. op. at 16.
Iowa's mandatory program has just been made the subject of a unique challenge. IOLTA
objectors have petitioned for the issuance of a writ of certiorari directed to the Iowa Supreme
Court's rule-making order of December 28, 1984. Ronwin v. Supreme Court of Iowa, cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3807 (U.S. May 14, 1985).
One challenge to an IOLTA program is pending. Florida's voluntary program is being challenged in Glaeser v. The Florida Bar, No. 84-1345 (M.D. Fla. filed Oct. 11, 1984). Plaintiff there
alleges that Florida's program constitutes a taking of property without due process of law, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. A preliminary injunction was denied on November 16,
1984. Glaeser v. The Florida Bar, No. 84-1345 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 1984) (order denying preliminary injunction), appeal dismissed as moot, No. 84-3796 (11th Cir. May 28, 1985).
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approve IOLTA programs.10° The supreme courts of Arkansas, 03

Florida,10 4 Minnesota, 10 5 New Hampshire,10 6 Utah, 0 7 and Washington'0 8 have expressly held IOLTA does not violate the fifth amendment because IOLTA creates income rather than takes property belonging to the client. The reported decisions adopting IOLTA
programs do little more than declare that IOLTA-generated income
is not the property of the client. Having declared the absence of a
property interest, none of the decisions examine the taking issue.10 9
For analytical purposes, IOLTA is unique, fitting into no obvious legal pigeonhole. Neither Webb's nor any other decision of the United
States Supreme Court demands the conclusion that IOLTA is or is
not a taking.
A. The Property Issue Identified
An analysis of the property issue cannot start with a declaration
that the earnings from a fund are the property of the fund owner. 110
Nor is it adequate to state "that no client is compelled to part with
'property' by reason of a state directive, since the program creates
income where there had been none before, and the income thus created would never benefit the client under ahy set of circum102. IOLTA UPDATe, supra note 1. None of the rejections rest explicitly on fifth amendment grounds.
103. In re Arkansas Bar Ass'n: Petition to Authorize a Program Governing Interest on
Lawyers' Trust Accts., 283 Ark. 252, 675 S.W.2d 355 (1984), overruling,In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accts., 279 Ark. 84, 648 S.W.2d 48 (1983).
104. In re Interest on Trust Accts., 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981).
105. Petition of Minnesota State Bar Ass'n, 332 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. 1982).
106. Petition of New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, 122 N.H. 971, 453 A.2d 1258 (1982).
107. In re Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accts., 672 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983).
108. In re Adoption of Amendments to CPR DR 9-102 IOLTA, No. 25700-A-351, slip op.
Wash. (June 19, 1984).
109. The California decision, supra note 101, accepted the "generalized claims that clients
have property rights in their money," Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094,
209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984), appeal denied, No. 4 Civ. 31635 (Cal. May 2, 1985), but found that
the IOLTA programs use of the income generated by those funds did not constitute a taking.
110. Baker & Wood, supra note 3, at 357, fall into this error, assuming that IOLTA "does
not create the right to recover interest income from client trust funds." Their pronouncement
ignores the difference between net and gross income and thus ignores the essential characteristic of nominal or short-term deposits that provides the foundation for the IOLTA concept. The
discussion of the client's "inchoate right to income" as property, in Comment, supra note 3, at
1009-11, similarly ignores the unique factual circumstances under which IOLTA operates. To
affxm, or deny, that someone has a "right" is merely to announce a conclusion that a court will,
or will not, grant relief. The conclusion, however, "provides no reason whatever why such relief
should," or should not, be granted. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV.1439, 1459 (1968) (emphasis in original). See United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945). See also Holmes, NaturalLaw,
32 HARv.L. REv. 40, 42 (1918) (for a jurisprudential discussion of a legal right as the basis of a
prophecy).
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stances.""' The initial burden IOLTA critics must meet is to define
the specific property, the specific "legitimate claim of entitlement,"
that IOLTA allegedly takes. 1 2 In order to fully understand the flaw
in the IOLTA critics' reasoning, it is necessary to compare the requirements of the IOLTA programs with the requirements of the
prior law regulating attorney trust accounts. IOLTA does not alter
the traditional pattern. The, attorney's duty to place client monies in
secure, available-on-demand accounts is not changed. IOLTA expressly preserves, if not strengthens, the attorney's obligation to
place client trust funds in interest-bearing accounts when the attorney and the attorney's client conclude the funds can produce income
net of transaction costs. The only real change IOLTA makes is requiring banks, which previously enjoyed the "free" use of clients'
nominal or short-term deposits, to pay interest.
Nothing has changed from the client's perspective. Client funds
attorneys hold in trust continue to be the property of the client. If
those funds are capable of producing income, the income produced,
less the costs of producing that income, 1 3 is also the property of the
client. 1 4 IOLTA does not affect these long established property rules.
If client funds individually cannot produce income net of expenses,
but can when pooled with other clients' funds, that net income is
similarly the property of the client." 5 IOLTA does not affect this
trust administration procedure. In neither circumstance, however,
could a client successfully assert a property claim to that portion of
111. In re Interest on Trust Accts., 402 So. 2d at 395. The Florida court's rationale was
adopted by the other courts which expressly considered the issue. See supra notes 103-08. The
Florida Supreme Court distinguished Webb's on two grounds: that the income created would
never benefit the client under any set of circumstances, and that the program was essentially
voluntary because attorneys would not participate if their clients voiced strong objections. 402
So. 2d at 395. The second ground is mere guesswork and is simply not relevant for mandatory
programs. Webb's can be distinguished for other, more relevant reasons, including the amount
of interest in excess of $90,000, the compelled nature of the payment into court, the apparent
double exaction, and the fact no police power rationale was offered to support the county's
claim to the income. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE REPORT supra note 11, at 7-11. If Webb's is not
controlling, only half the equation has been answered. For if the differences cited are significant, they do not of themselves establish the absence of a taking.
112. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Roth entitlement test is equally applicable to fifth amendment claims where the issue is whether the claimant has a property right. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S: 516 (1982); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
113. The trustee is entitled to reimbursement for the costs necessarily incurred to produce income, as well as the costs necessary to safeguard and administer the trust. 3 A. ScoTT,
supra note 15, § 242.
114. The owner of a fund is properly deemed the owner of the net income. Id. vol. 2,
§ 182.
115. The use of common or pooled trust funds is described in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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the gross income representing the expenses of producing the income.
In short, deposits which would have earned the client nothing prior
to IOLTA still earn the client nothing. Deposits which would have
earned income for the client still do.
IOLTA takes advantage of the traditional trust rules, combines
them with the realities of banking and attorney trust account requirements and, in effect, shifts the real but unitemized costs of producing the income from the trustee to the provision of legal services
to the poor. Net income is possible only because IOLTA aggregates
nominal or short-term deposits and pays the interest earned to a single beneficiary, thus avoiding the cost of individual accounting, administration and tax reporting. There is no reason in either fairness
or logic why IOLTA's shift of income from banks to the providers of
legal services should serve to grant the client a previously nonexistent
property interest.
The assertion that the owner of a fund also owns any income the
fund produces is the widest possible claim of right. If this is the applicable criterion, then IOLTA does deprive clients of property. Yet
the claim to all income, simplicter,fails to recognize the cost of producing that income. Assume a slightly more than nominal or shortterm trust fund. Upon creation of the fund, the trustee is entitled to
recover his expenses as well as charge a fee for his services. The beneficiary is left with little or no income. 116 Moreover, if the trustee in
good faith miscalculates the income-producing potential of the principle, the beneficiary might even be left with a negative balance, per17
haps offset by invasion of the principal.
The distinction between gross and net income serves to narrow
the focus of the property claim. IOLTA proponents, in their constitutional calculus, impute the real but unitemized costs attorneys and
financial institutions incur. By recognizing those real, albeit unallocated, costs IOLTA proponents correctly argue clients suffer absolutely no loss. Nevertheless, the claim that "IOLTA creates income"
is too broad. Nominal or short-term deposits can produce income.
What they cannot produce is income net of expenses. What IOLTA
provides, therefore, is a mechanism for the creation of net income in
a situation where only the intervention of IOLTA makes the creation
of net income possible.
The rule of law enunciated in Webb's, that the "earnings of a
fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and are property
' properly understood, is limited
just as the fund itself is property,"""
116. 3 A. Scorr, supra note 15, §§ 242, 244.
117. Id. § 233.
118. 449 U.S. at 164.
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to the net income generated by the fund. That reading of Webb's is
manifest from the Court's discussion of the right to charge a fee for
services, or perhaps retain the interest income when that is the only
fee charged. Moreover, limiting the Court's holding to the net income
produced by the fund is -fully consistent with the usual trust rule that
the beneficiary is only entitled to the net income. The property claim
must be evaluated in the context of these long established rules.
For analytical purposes, IOLTA is best viewed as a modification
of trust administration principles allowing recognition of the real but
unitemized costs of administering attorney trust accounts. In that
light, the specific property question is whether the owner of a fund
which cannot by itself produce income net of expenses is entitled to a
proportionate share of the gross income produced by pooling his fund
with other funds which also could not, on their own, produce income
net of expenses. Clearly, the owner does not suffer any loss because
his funds individually could not produce income net of expenses. The
absence of loss, however, does not alone establish the absence of a
property interest.
The validity of the modification depends on whether the traditional rules of property law support the assertion of the right to all
the income. The validity of the modification is difficult to discern by
reference to the law of trusts alone. It can, however, be answered
more broadly by reference to economic realities, banking law restrictions on the income-producing ability of deposits and the inherent
nature of attorney trust accounts. The combination of factors which
prevents nominal or short-term funds from producing income net of
expenses casts doubt on the critics' claim to a constitutionally protected entitlement to all the income. In light of the unique circumstances posed by IOLTA, the "determinative question is whether...
[the client] holds such a legitimate claim of entitlement [to the income] that the Constitution, rather than the political branches, must
define the procedures attending its removal." 119 In the absence of
positive rules of law or mutually explicit understandings sufficient to
satisfy the expectation and reliance theory employed in Roth, 20 the
modification of trust law worked by IOLTA does not offend the fifth
amendment.
B. The Taking Issue Identified
The taking aspect may furnish IOLTA proponents stronger sup119. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 796 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
120. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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port for their claim that IOLTA does not impair fifth amendment
rights. IOLTA critics contend that if the client's funds are used to
produce income, and the income is not distributed to the client because of an IOLTA program, then property of the client has been
taken. The contrary position, that IOLTA creates income that would
never benefit the client under any set of circumstances, is remarkably
similar to the rationale of the Florida Supreme Court which the
United States Supreme Court rejected in Webb's. 121 Nevertheless,
while the rationale is similar, the factual circumstances are very
different.
The relevant facts of Webb's and IOLTA are not analogous. Perhaps the most important distinction is that the Webb's fund, $1.8
million held for more than a year,' 2 2 was neither nominal nor shortterm. Economic reality compelled the conclusion that the Webb's
fund should be invested. By its very nature, the interest the Webb's
fund earned was clearly the property of someone other than the
county. Conversely, the inherent inability of nominal or short-term
funds to generate positive income compels the conclusion that nominal or short-term client deposits should not be invested. The threshold ability of the two funds to generate income is of critical importance. Unlike the Webb's fund, the individual components of the
IOLTA fund are inherently incapable of producing significant income. The client, no matter what he does, can never earn income net
of expenses on a nominal or short-term trust fund deposit. IOLTA,
by aggregating nominal or short-term deposits and eliminating most
transaction costs, truly has created income where income previously
could not exist. Under no set of circumstances does the owner of a
nominal or short-term trust fund deposit have the ability to earn positive interest. This intrinsic factor, not the IOLTA program, deprives
the nominal or short-term deposit of any income-producing potential.
Moreover, the interest generated by a nominal or short-term deposit is, in real economic terms, less than the cost incurred by the
attorney-trustee to administer the deposit. The customary trust relationship permits the trustee to recover both the costs of administering the trust and a fee for services rendered. The premise behind
IOLTA is that the income generated because of IOLTA does not exceed and is essentially the equivalent of those charges. Therefore, the
attorney would, in fact, seem to have the greater claim to the
12
earnings. 3
121.
U.S. 155
122.
123.

Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 374 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1979), rev'd, 449
(1980).
449 U.S. at 159.
Absent rules regulating the conduct of attorneys, the client and attorney could ex-
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The Webb's holding is also limited to "the narrow circumstances"
where the government, in addition to retaining the interest income,
also receives a fee "for services rendered." The Court expressed "no
view as to the constitutionality of a statute that prescribes a county's
retention of interest earned, where the interest would be the only return to the county for services it renders."' 2 4 Unlike the interpleader
fund in Webb's, an individual client's nominal or short-term funds
have no ability to produce income net of expenses. To award IOLTAgenerated income to the client is to award the client a windfall. The
differences between the IOLTA and Webb's situations are sufficiently
great to permit the conclusion that Webb's is not controlling. Nevertheless, the superficial similarity compels an examination of whether
IOLTA's use of client trust deposits "takes" any legitimate claim of
entitlement from a client, just as the uncertainty in application of a
definition of property compels closer scrutiny of the property issue.
V.

THE PROPERTY ISSUE ANALYZED

A. The Descriptive Approach to Defining Property
This section explores whether the competing property claims can
be resolved, as a threshold matter, solely by examination of the
meaning of the word "property."' 2 5 The intuitive assertion of IOLTA
opponents that any income produced must be allocated to each individual client in proportion to each client's share of the pooled attorplicitly agree, or the custom and practice could sanction, the attorney's placement of client
funds at interest, with the attorney retaining any interest earned. In that situation, the attorney-client relationship would be no different from the depositor-bank relationship. Today, in
the United Kingdom, the solicitor retains interest earned on short-term or nominal client
funds. Solicitors' Accounts (Deposit Interest) Rules (1965). Rule 3 dictates that amounts in
excess of 500 pounds expected to be held for two months or more should be deposited at interest for the benefit of the client. See COUNCIL OF LAW SOCIETY, A GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT OF SOLICITORS

(London 1974).

124. 449 U.S. at 165.
125. It may oversimplify the analysis to treat the issues of property and taking separately.
Nevertheless, failure to do so ignores an essential threshold determination. Professor Stoebuck
notes:
The constitutional concepts of "taking" and "property" are intertwined. To discuss one
sometimes requires the making of assumptions about the nature of the other. In fact one
of the persistent problems that complicates most analysis of certain difficult eminent
domain cases is the failure of judges and legal writers to separate the two concepts. Rigorous separation is necessary for analysis. ...
Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057, 1083 (1980).
The threshold is also important for another reason. Before a claim of taking can be examined,
there must be a specific item of property at issue. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclam.
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 3
1984]

INTEREST OF LAWYERS' TRUST ACCOUNTS

ney trust account is certainly not weak. Undeniably, the beneficiary
of a trust is entitled to the net income produced by the trust res.12 It
is often said, although not usually for purposes of deciding a concrete
controversy, that the essence of property is the right to the income
generated therefrom. 127 This assertion, however, is overbroad, and belied by Webb's, if it is meant to include more than the net income
produced by the res. IOLTA's imputation of the real but unitemized

costs of trust administration, and the shift of those costs to the provision of legal services to the poor, produces a hybrid, thoroughly
scrambling the distinction between gross and net income. Whether
the property/no property conflict can be resolved by a methodology
that defines the word "property" is the question for this section,
which searches for a reasoned and principled way to resolve the property/no property conflict by examining what we mean when we use
the word "property."
The typical taking case involves real property. The threshold
question, therefore, of whether the proposed governmental action impacts on property of the claimant is generally not at issue.12 Nonetheless, the issue of whether a claimant possesses a protectible property interest is very much alive where other than real property
interests are at stake. 2 9 Indeed, the common law has a long tradition
30
of determining whether newly asserted rights constitute property.
The word "property" appears four times in the Constitution.13 1 Yet
nowhere in the Constitution is the word defined. In hornbook terms,
property is said to denote the group of rights inhering in the individual's relation to a physical thing.1 3 2 Of course, to speak only of a
126. 3 A. ScoTr. supra note 15, §§ 242, 244.
127. "What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). The right to profit, however, has
never been deemed the critical element of property. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
128. The critical issues to be assessed can be approached in different ways. It is possible
to consider the question of "property" and "taking" as only one question. One view is that the
definition of property is essentially self-evident and that a detailed analysis of the issue simply
serves to obscure the fact that property is, in fact, taken. Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 351, 363.
129. Compare Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (a person covered by the Social
Security Act does not have a protectable property right to receive old age benefit payments)
with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (those entitled to welfare benefits have protectable
property interests and the benefits cannot be terminated without sufficient due process requirements). See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
130. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1938).
But see Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315 (1932), where the Court noted that "[b]eyond the
traditional boundaries of the common law only some imperative justification in policy will lead
the courts to recognize in old values new property rights." Id. at 319.
131. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, amend. V (twice), and amend. XIV, § 1.
132. ' See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1917). In more detail, property has been defined as a "complex
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physical thing is far too narrow. The law recognizes many non-tangible items as property. 133 Moreover, property concepts are not static.
As civilization changes, civilization's conception of property also
changes.
The search for meaning begins with philosophy. American property law is the legacy of a long common law tradition. Foreshadowing
Locke, the 1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties guaranteed to each
individual the right to own cattle, goods and estates. Nevertheless,
colonial New Englanders insisted the use of private property not be
contrary to the needs and interests of the general welfare.13 4 While
professing to adhere to Lockean principles, they saw no inconsistency
3 5 American property
in regulating wages, prices and interest rates."
law is said to owe its basic principles to Locke's theory of natural law,
premised on the right of every individual to acquire ownership of private property, ownership that flowed from the individual's use and
labor in working the land. 136 Locke's philosophy comfortably fit the
system of recognized rights and duties with reference to the control of valuable objects . . .
linked with basic economic processes . . . validated by traditional beliefs, attitudes and values
and sanctioned in custom and law." Hollowell, The Nature and Function of Property as a
Social Institution, J. LEG. & POL. Soc. 115 (1943), quoted in 1 POWELL, ON REAL PROPERTY 7,
at 10 (P. Rohan ed. 1977).
133. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982) (lien); United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977) (contract rights).
134. W. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY FROM THE
SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 11

(1977).

135. Id.
136. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (T. Peardon ed. 1952). Locke's position can be summed up as follows:
Locke argued that God originally gave the world in common to humankind. In its natural
state, however, the world was essentially worthless. Property rights existed in each person's own body and its labor. That which was removed from the commons by an individual's labor became that individual's property. Only when one mixed the "Labor of his
Body and the Work of his Hands" with the essentially worthless commons was there
created private property that had value.
Leeson & Sullivan, Property, Philosophy and Regulation: The Case Against a Natural Law
Theory of Property Rights, 17 WILLAMETTE L.J. 527, 560 (1981) (footnote omitted). According
to the authors,
Locke's natural rights theory of property ownership in the presocial state of nature was
grounded on two suppositions. First, Locke assumed that by nature private property
ownership was related directly to use and to labor. Second, he assumed that by nature
opportunities always would exist for those who desired to acquire property to do so
through physical work on the land. Everyone could pursue private interests in property - so long as they adhered to the moral obligation to mix their labor with that
property - without running into conflicts with others who similarly were pursuing their
private interest. If human beings would adhere to the laws of nature, private property
ownership would be distributed relatively equally and few if any conflicts would arise.
Government would be unnecessary and people could remain in their simple natural state.
Id. at 561. See also Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law,
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unique American circumstance of easily and inexpensively available
a profound influence on early American conceptions
land and exerted
137
of property.
Locke's concept of private property, perhaps suitable for an
agrarian seventeenth century society, 138 furnishes little help in understanding the ever-changing complex relationships that exist in the
modern world.1 39 Nevertheless, the American Revolution spoke the
language of Locke.14 0 Land was the politically significant form of
property. Locke's natural rights theory was interpreted primarily to
mean each individual had both the right to acquire and use land and
the right to become a freehold farmer.1 " The Constitutional Convention intended to protect property rights, meaning ownership of land
and other tangible items. Protection of those rights confronted the
courts almost immediately after adoption of the Constitution. They
held the preservation of property a primary object of the social compact. 142 "At first statutes were invalidated avowedly for mere violations of natural rights, absent any constitutional prohibition covering
42 HARv.L. REV. pt. I, 149, & pt. II, 365 (1928) (the Constitution is composed of higher law and
arises from the sovereignty of the people); Felhnan, The European Background of Early Amer-

ican Ideas ConcerningProperty, 14 TEMP.L.Q. 497 (1940) (property is sacred and springs from
the personality of man and by virtue of higher law man is entitled to things he has acquired);
Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67
(1931) (the right to property is derived from a higher law which civil law can recognize but not
destroy); Grant, The NaturalLaw Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM L. REv. 56 (1931)
(natural, inherent and inalienable rights exist regardless of recognition by the Constitution);
Hutcheson, The Natural Law and the Right to Property, 26 NoTRE DAME LAW. 640 (1951) (a
natural law right exists to acquire property and to not be deprived of property without civil law
furnish a foundation for property law and may still
due process). Natural law concepts still
override the notion that only positive law can create property rights. PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 91-95 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). Still, property rights can be terminated without
violation of the fifth amendment. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). Annot., 87
A.L.R.3d 1011 (1978).
137. W. ScOT, supra note 134, at 11.
138. Leeson & Sullivan, supra note 136, at 562.
139. Locke's political theory led to the concept that a higher or natural law limited the
state's power to interfere with liberty and property. That philosophy finds early expression in
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 386 (1798). Some have argued that it comes to full fruition in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Locke, however, was not advancing the position that
private property rights were superior to government's need to regulate for the benefit of all.
Nor was he advocating the unlimited accumulation of private wealth. According to Locke, God
had given man only "as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it
spoils, so much he may by his labor fix a property in; whatever is beyond this is more than his
share, and belongs to others." J. LocKE, supra note 136, 31. Locke, therefore, cannot be read
to condemn governmental restrictions of the use of private property, although he certainly
meant to limit the power of the legislature. W. ScoTT, supra note 134, at 30-35.
140. P. LARKIN, PROPERTY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 145 (1969).
141. W. ScoTt, supra note 134, at 45-54.
142. Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (D. Pa. 1795). See P. LARKIN,
supra note 140, at 150.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss4/3

28

Siegel: Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account Programs: Do They "Take" "Prop
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

the case; and the contrary view made its way with great difficulty in
both state and federal courts."' 4 3
Eventually, however, Bentham's position, that property is not created by natural law but. instead is entirely the creation of mankind,
prevailed. Thus "[p]roperty and law are born and must die together.
Before laws were made there was no property: take away the laws, all
property ceases."144 The continuing protection of traditional common
law property rights may still be attributable to our inheritance from
Locke. As the Roth doctrine makes clear, however, other claims of
property depend on identifying positive rules of law, an approach
fully consistent with Bentham's philosophy.
How to identify and apply the relevant positive rules of law is
what concerns us here. When can it be said a claimant has a property
right? When can one assert ownership? Care must be taken to distinguish the after-the-fact descriptive definition of property from the
analytical tools necessary to determine if the claim under considera143.

Philbrick, supra note 1.30, at 716-17. J. SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECT-

ING INTERESTS IN LAND 10 (1953) states:

[Wihen all is said and done, there have really been exceedingly few cases in which a
statute was actually declared invalid on natural law grounds, notwithstanding the many
discussions in the earlier cases concerning natural rights, the social compact, and the
inherent incapacity of an American government to take away life, liberty, or property
except when necessary for the general good.
The most famous case is Gardner v. Trustees of the Village of Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 7
Am. Dec. 526 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). The latest is Parham v. The Justices & Decatur County, 9 Ga.
341 (1851). Ultimately, the Supreme Court was to reject the claim of natural rights as a limitation on state action. See Munn v. People of Illinois, 94 U.S. (4 Otto.) 113 (1877); Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Soon thereafter, however, the Supreme Court substituted substantive due process in its place. W. SCOTT,supra note 134, at 145-46. The "switch in
time saves nine" ended that era of property rights. Nevertheless, adherence to Lockean principles is evident, for example, in recent criticisms of IOLTA programs. Commentators Baker and
Wood reflect a Lockean viewpoint, arguing that, as a matter of some unnamed property right,
interest must follow principal as a matter of course. They cite the statement of Mr. Justice
Johnson: "In equity, interest goes with the principal, as the fruit with the tree." Baker & Wood,
supra note 3, at 357 n.161, citing Himely v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 313, 319 (1809). That
assertion, however, was offered to define the elements of a damage claim, not as a definition of
property. Moreover, recovery of interest was denied. For a present day, extreme Lockean view,
see Pilon, Property Rights, Takings, and a Free Society, 6 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 165
(1983).
144. J. BENTHAM, "Theory of Legislation, Principles of the Civil Code, Part I," ch. 5, reprinted in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 308-09 (J. Bowring ed. 1962). See also Felix Cohen's proposition:

That is property to which the following label can be attached:
To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.
Signed: Private Citizen

Endorsed: The State
Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 374 (1954).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 3

19841

INTEREST OF LAWYERS' TRUST ACCOUNTS

tion qualifies as property. Examples of after-the-fact definitions of
property abound. For example, property has been defined as "a valuable right or interest in something rather than the thing itself...
the right to possess, use and dispose of that something in such a
manner as is not inconsistent with law.' 1 45 Put somewhat differently,
the term property "embraces everything which has exchangeable
value or goes to make up a man's wealth - every interest or estate
which the law regards of sufficient value for judicial recognition."14' 6
The circularity of these definitions is apparent. They are conclusions,
not meaningful methods to test claims of right.
Even the more elaborate attempts at objective definitions of property do not provide definitive methods to test claims of right. Professor Timothy Terrell's two recent articles are examples of that failure. 147 Terrel posits that the effort to define the term "property"
"can be divided into two distinct, although complementary and
somewhat overlapping, subcategories. The first is the attempt to describe the various discrete rights and limitations that are implied by
the label. The second is the effort to justify philosophically and morally the rights and limitations that have been identified. 1 48 The
technique for examining the descriptive element, according to Terrell, involves four steps:
First, a detailed identification must be made of the full range
of specific rights, limitations on rights, interactions among
rights, and application of rights to various sorts of "things,"
all of which together constitute the substance of the term
"property" as it is used in legal contexts .... The second
step deduces order from this chaos of data by isolating and
identifying the instance of private ownership in which each of
these variables is at a kind of maximum, producing the most
archetypical example of this concept - the "central case" or
145. State v. Ensley, 240 Ind. 472, 487, 164 N.E.2d 342, 349 (1960), citing Department of
Fin. Inst. v. Holt, 231 Ind. 293, 303, 108 N.E.2d 629, 634 (1952).
146. Diffendall v. Diffendall, 239 Md. 32, 36, 209 A.2d 914, 915 (Ct. App. 1965), citing
Samet v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 247 F. 669 (4th Cir. 1917).
147. Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the
"Government-as-Monopolist" Theory of the Due Process Clause, 31 EmORY L.J. 491 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Terrell, Causes of Action]. See his earlier work, Terrell, "Property," "Due
Process," and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEo. L.J.
861 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Terrell, Property, Due Process], which contains the more extensive discussion of the definitional aspect of property. Professor Terrell counts at least 140
articles dealing with the concept of property and due process subsequent to the decision in
Roth. He counts a further 160 articles concerned with property and the takings clause. Id. at
864. Although both Terrell articles propose a theory of property in the context of Roth due
process, the definitional method, if valid, should be equally applicable to the property definition problem of the takings clause of the fifth amendment.
148. Terrell, Causes of Action, supra note 147, at 493 (emphasis in original).
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"focal meaning." This becomes the case to which all other instances or claims of "property" status are then compared to
determine whether use of this label is proper. . . .The propriety of the use of the label is then determined by the third
step, which establishes around the central case some boundary
or perimeter that encloses the set of instances whose analogy
to the central case is strong enough to result in use of the
label. . . .The fourth step is the recognition that the proper
handling and labeling of any new case of claimed "property"
interest rests fundamentally on its analogy to the central case,
not on its similarity to any other cases in the property set.149
Terrell suggests that Professor A.M. Honor6's essay, Ownership,150
identifies the elements that accurately describe the central case. Honor6 identified eleven "standard incidents of ownership" which, he
argued, defined the "greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system of law recognizes."' 51
1. The right of possession, which includes the right to
clude others;
2. The right to personal use and enjoyment;
3. The right to manage, meaning to decide how and
whom the item owned may be used;
4. The right to the income, meaning entitlement to any
come produced, either as a result of personal use or by
lowing use by others;

exby
inal-

149. Id. at 493-96 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Terrell's starting point is
H.L.A. Hart's "central" or "typical" case. Terrell, Property, Due Process, supra note 147, at
863-88, citing H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Hart meant the "most essential, irreducible" or "core elements" that characterize our understanding of a concept. Terrell, Property,
Due Process, supra note 147, at 866. The use of the central or typical case for comparison
purposes with the item under consideration depends on how accurately it identifies all the elements that fully describe a concept. Many, if not most, assertions of property will not encompass all the elements of the central case. Therefore, it is necessary to establish an outer perimeter. The absence of too many elements places the property assertion under examination outside
the definition. Id. at 867-68. The major difficulty, a difficulty not addressed by the definitional
process, occurs in attempting to set the outer perimeter.
150. Honor6, Ownership, reprinted in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. Guest,
ed. 1961). Honor6 rejects the natural law theory of property and argues that property is a creature of positive law by emphasizing that ownership is subject to "characteristic prohibitions
and limitations." Id. at 113.
151. Id. at 108 (emphasis in original deleted). Other lists of essential elements have been
suggested. Usually, they reduce the number of elements denoting full ownership, postulating
that many of the elements identified by Honor6 are subsets of other elements. See Snare, The

Concept of Property, 9 Am.PHIL. Q. 200, 202-04 (1972). L. BECKER,

PROPERTY RIGHTS, PHILO-

soPHIc FOUNDATIONS 18-23 (1977), suggests that the "right to the capital," standing alone, is
enough to define ownership. According to Becker, "[o]ne who has all the rights in the list save
that of capital may own the thing in a derivative sense, but the one who has the right to the
capital is 'fundamentally' the owner." Id. at 20.
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5. The right to the capital, meaning the power to alienate
and the liberty to consume, waste or destroy;
6. The right to security, meaning the item continues to be
the property of the owner indefinitely, subject only to the
state's power of eminent domain, bankruptcy of the owner, or
execution process for debt;
7. The incident of transmissibility, meaning that the item
passes indefinitely to the heirs of the owner and each successive heir;
8. The incident of absence of term, meaning that ownership
rights do not end on a fixed date or upon the occurrence of a
stated contingency;
9. Prohibition of harmful use, meaning, in a restricted sense,
the police power regulation of use;
10. Liability to execution, meaning that the property can be
lost for debt, either by way of execution or bankruptcy; and
11. Residuary character, meaning that when interests less
terminate, the owner
than ownership (for example, leaseholds)
1 52
recovers that outstanding interest.
Honor6 does not suggest any single incident, or any combination
of incidents short of all of them, establishes ownership per se. Moreover, "each of the elements is susceptible of varying definitions not, perhaps, enough to alter the general idea, but enough to alter
emphasis and practical consequences" and each element is of "varying scope,' particularly among different legal systems. 153 Nevertheless, as Honor6 suggests, delineation of the standard incidents is essential if the strength of the analogies in peripheral cases is to be
assessed.
Employment of Terrell's method, using Honor 's eleven standard
incidents as a working hypothesis, suggests the need for a comparison
between the factual circumstances relevant to the conclusion that the
beneficiary of a trust is entitled to the income produced by that trust
and the factual circumstances surrounding the creation, use, and termination of attorney trust accounts. If the circumstances appeared
sufficiently alike, we could conclude that the right to the earnings
from an attorney trust, like the right to the earnings from the customary trust, were sufficiently identical so that both should be
deemed the property of the beneficiary.15 4 In making that careful
152. Honor6, supra note 150, at 113-28.
153. L. BECKER, supra note 151, at 19-20.
154. The limits of the scope of comparison are not identified by Terrell. If the practice in
England, see supra note 123, or other English common law countries is relevant, the property
claim, qua property, fails. Honor6 argues "that the standard incidents of ownership do not vary
from system to system in [an] erratic, unpredictable way.., but.. . have a tendency to
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comparison, however, we should note that, for customary trusts, the
beneficiary's property interest only extends to the income net of expenses. The property claim of the IOLTA critic is more extensive.
The claim to all the income, or put differently, to ignore the real but
imputed costs, would place in doubt the identical nature of the comparison. That lack of comparability would make it difficult to draw
more than an intuitive conclusion concerning whether the property
claims at issue were identical.
The second step of the analysis would start with agreement that
the net income of the customary trust is within the outer boundary
circumscribing the central case. The net income is the property of the
beneficiary. Little guidance would be available, however, to assist in
deciding whether the differences, although slight, between the net income of the customary trust and the hybrid income derived from
nominal or short-term funds of the attorney trust affected the determination of whether the IOLTA-produced income from the attorney
trust also fell within the outer boundary. Trusts, in general, lack
most of the standard elements denoting ownership. Income earned on
nominal or short-term funds in lawyers' trust accounts is even further removed. We might argue that as "a matter of factual description, [gross interest earned on attorney trust accounts does not] . . .
have enough in common with things we clearly own, like our books,
furniture, etc., to deserve" the generic label property. 5 We are unable to reach that conclusion with any assurance of certainty, however,
because we lack a meaningful way to set the outer perimeter. Nor do
we receive any help from Terrell on this critical issue.
Understanding how far the perimeter extends may be aided by
Honor6's suggestion that different types of things can be owned in
different ways. He classifies things that can be owned into five
groups:
1. Material objects and interests in material objects;
2. Claims, and interests in claims;
3. Fixed collections of material objects, claims or both;
4. Variable collections of material objects, claims or both;
and
156
5. Funds.
remain constant from place to place." Honor6, supra note 150, at 109. In fact, other countries
with a common law heritage find property concepts no bar to IOLTA. See Boone, supra note 1,
at 542-50. See also In re Interest on Trust Accts., 356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978); 402 So. 2d 389
(Fla. 1981). Query what that means for comparison purposes in the IOLTA context.
155. Terrell, Causes of Action, supra note 147, at 505-06.
156. Honor6, supra note 150, at 132.
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The five classes of property reflect a declining application of the
standard incidents. All eleven standard incidents apply to the typical
ownership case of material objects. Yet only three, transmissibility,
income, and capital rights, apply to the last category: funds. Acceptance of Honor6's classes of property broadens our understanding of
those items that can be classed as property. Honor6, however, was
not attempting to set an outer limit. His descriptive method is just
that, a description. It is not an analytical tool to assess assertions of
property.
Only a normative theory of property permits the outer perimeter
to be drawn. 157 A normative theory requires the development and examination of a philosophical justification for deeming any particular
claim to be property. For without a theory, neutral decision-making
fails. 15s Little purpose would be served in attempting to apply the
myriad of normative theories of property to the IOLTA property issue.15 For they are simply theories, not actual methods of judicial
157. Honor6 notes that describing what ownership is does not provide the answer to how
far ownership extends. "No obvious linguistic convention governs the answer. . . and, if the
rules of the legal system demand an answer, it must be sought in positive law, in the comparative strength of competing analogies with the paradigm case and in the light shed on the problem by the social context." Id. at 111. Because any effort at definition will of necessity be vague
in spots, "[t]here will remain a need for some further conception of the purpose a system of
property rights is to serve and the moral constraints an acceptable system must satisfy, these
serving as guides when the current conception of property rights must be clarified or extended." T. SCANLON, COMMENTS ON ACKERMAN'S PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION, in
PROPERTY, NOMOS XXII 341, 345-46 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman, eds. 1980).
158. The Roth distinction between entitlements and expectancies, if considered a normative theory, is said to offer "little guidance to those who need to solve problems relating to the
meaning of property." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548 (2d ed.
1983). Terrell agrees, noting that Roth fails "to provide any guidance as to the sorts of rules
and understandings, and the corresponding degree of expectation and reliance, that it would
find adequate to trigger due process protections." Terrell, Property,Due Process, supra note
147, at 886. The surprising outcome in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982),
confirms the open-ended and ambiguous nature of Roth. See Smolla, The Reemergence of the
Right-PrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw: The Price of ProtestingToo Much, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 69 (1982). Of course, Terrell proposes his own theory, labeled "Government as Monopolist," which, he argues, is consistent with the Court's reliance and expectation doctrine. His
theory is that when an individual must look to the government for a benefit, the individual
possesses a property interest sufficient to trigger due process protection. Where the government
is a competitor with the private market, however, no property rights exist. Terrell, Property,
Due Process,supra note 147, at 904-08.
159. The four most frequently cited theories of property, according to Terrell, are:
(1) John Locke's "labor" theory, according to which property is a sort of just dessert for
personal efforts; (2) George Hegel's "personality" theory, which relates property to a
more ambiguous exercise of our wills where external things are incorporated'into our
sense of ourselves; (3) the "utilitarian" theories of, among others, David Hume, Jeremy
Bentham, and the modern economic theorists, which use the term property to describe
the set of rules that are essential for efficient use of resources; and (4) Robert Nozick's
"entitlement" theory according to which the legitimacy of present claims to one's posses-
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decision-making. Two theories, however, which do claim to mirror
current judicial decision-making, are worth examining for that very
reason. The first Professor Bruce Ackerman's "Ordinary Observer,"
may help us to set the perimeter. 160
Ackerman posits two fundamentally different ways of examining
legal issues, which he calls Ordinary Observing and Scientific Policymaking. The former, said to correspond to current judicial decision-making, relies on everyday language and expectations. The latter
assumes the existence of a property right in any previously existing
use. This approach suggests that only a philosophical view of the purposes to be served by private property and the fifth amendment will
provide an adequate methodology for solving taking claims. 16 The
Ordinary Observer would have little difficulty solving the IOLTA issue. It is important to recognize, however, that Ackerman believes
Ordinary Observing, while corresponding to current judicial methods,
is an inadequate analytical tool.
According to Ackerman, when the Ordinary Observer is confronted with the question of whether a particular claim constitutes
property, he relies on "everyday, non-legal ways of speaking" to discover the meaning of the term.' Private property, to the Ordinary
Observer, is represented by a physical thing, not a lawyer's bundle of
rights. 6 ' Terrell's hunt for a definition of property might easily be
called sophisticated ordinary observing.
sions depends almost entirely on the historical pedigree of that claim.
Terrell, Property, Due Process, supra note 147, at 874-75 (footnotes omitted). None of these
theories support a client's claim to the gross income without deduction for expenses. The labor
theory of Locke justifies ownership of the underlying thing, the principal. Yet it can hardly be
said to justify a claim to interest earnings of monies deposited with an attorney. There is obviously no "labor" associated with such earnings. The "personality" theory is a similarly slim
reed. Utilitarian or economic theories do not suggest the most efficient use is to award the
interest to the client. Indeed, they undoubtedly suggest the converse. See infra text accompanying notes 306-20. The "entitlement" or "historical pedigree" theory has little or nothing to do
with earnings. Terrell's own "government as monopolist" theory would indicate that, because
clients are not usually forced to deposit funds with their attorneys, they have no claim well
founded in property law. Terrell, Property, Due Process, supra note 147, at 901-11.
160. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).
161. Ackerman calls The Scientific Policymaker's concept a Comprehensive View. It is
discussed in infra text accompanying notes 255-63.
162. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 160, at 10. In a complex society, expectations will diverge
causing Ordinary Observing to break down.
163. B. ACKERMAN, FOUR QUESTIONS FOR LEGAL THEORY, in PROPERTY, NOMOS XXII, at
351, 364 n.28 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman, eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as B. ACKERMAN, FOUR
QUESTIONS]. The Ordinary Observer rejects the bundle of rights approach. Instead:
A particular thing is Layman's thing when: (a) Layman may, without negative social
sanction, use the thing in lots more ways than others can; and (b) others need a specially
compelling reason if they hope to escape the negative social sanctions that are normally
visited upon those who use another's things without receiving his permission.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 3
1984]

INTEREST OF LAWYERS' TRUST ACCOUNTS

Ordinary Observing is a doubtful method of explaining current judicial decision-making because it turns on Ackerman's artificial distinction between "social property" and "legal property." Social property is property protected simply because existing social practices
afford protection. Legal property, on the other hand, exists whenever
a person, based on social customs, does not "believe himself justified
in claiming something as his without appealing to the opinion of a
legal specialist."'164 Ackerman asserts that the courts protect social
property as a matter of course. The holders of legal property, however, do not fare nearly as well.16 5
The Ordinary Observer's concept of property involves present
physical possession. In its broadest form, it might be characterized as
the difference between tangible and intangible property. While the
Ordinary Observer expects to have his money used as directed, once
money is deposited by the client with the attorney, it can no longer
be identified as a "thing." It is no longer social property. The Ordinary Observer would recognize that the funds were no longer subject
to the physical possession and control of the client. Nor would the
client have an expectation of earning interest. According to the Ordinary Observer, therefore, there would be no property interest to be
taken.
Ackerman's claim that Ordinary Observing corresponds to the
B. ACKERMAN, supra note 160, at 99-100 (emphasis in original). The Scientific Policymaker recognizes that property constitutes any "legally authorized use." Change the prevailing pattern of
use, for whatever reason, and the Scientific Policymaker understands that the merits must be
assessed under the rubric of just compensation. B. AcKERmA, FOuR QUESTIONS, supra, at 36667.
164. B. AcKERmAN, supra note 160, at 117.
165. Id. at 121. The reviewers have been unkind to the Ordinary Observer's conception of
property, arguing that it is a far too narrow view of what the nonlawyer deems property. It is
also a far too narrow view of what the courts will protect. See Alexander, The Concept of
Property in Private and Constitutional Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal
Analysis, 82 COLUmA L. REv. 1545 (1982). Soper, On the Relevance of Philosophy to Law: Reflections on Ackerman's PrivateProperty and the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 44 (1979),
argues that legal doctrine's heavy reliance on ordinary modes of perception is justifiable on
normative grounds. Soper argues that the link between property and existing, dominant institutions is in large part analytical, and that in difficult cases, where social institutions are in flux,
Ordinary Observing and Scientific Policymaking do not necessarily point in different directions.
Id. at 64. Epstein, Book Review, The Next Generationof Legal Scholarship?, 30 STAN. L. Rv.
635, 656 (1978), argues that Ordinary Observing need not be "ignorant observing" and that the
distinction between "legal" and "social" property is far too artificial. See also Humbach, Book
Review, 39 U. Prrr. L. Ray. 793 (1978) (unclear, leaving too many questions unresolved); Ozar,
Book Review, Ackerman on Property and the Law, 10 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 247 (1979) (valuable for
its insights and analytical tools but some ambiguous distinctions between scientific and ordinary). T. SCANLON, supra note 157, at 341, 343 (J.Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980) notes that
the Ordinary Observer may well possess a normative view of property as well as a concept of
the purpose the norm serves - "[O]rdinary property is neither static nor untheoretical." Id. at
343.
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layperson's idea of property presents a far too narrow view of the
ordinary person's conception of property. It also presents a far too
narrow view of what courts actually do when deciding property
claims. In effect, it ignores Honor6's categories of property. Although
it provides a simple answer to the IOLTA inquiry, it fails to provide
an adequate norm for setting the outer boundary. Moreover, the
outer boundary it does set is of far too small a radius. Nevertheless,
as a common sense approach to IOLTA, it does seem fully consistent
with the analytical methods of those courts which have approved
IOLTA programs. Those courts have focused directly on the realities
of the situation, rather than concentrating on abstract, technical concepts of property. For the fact is that under no circumstances does
the client who deposits nominal or short-term funds into an attorney's trust account have the ability to earn, or the expectation of
earning, interest income.
A normative theory with a far wider conception of property, a theory said to be premised on Roth's expectation and reliance doctrine,
is Professor Gregory Alexander's concept of subordinated interests. 6
His thesis, built largely around a rejection of Ackerman's Ordinary
Observer methodology, argues that traditional means of assessing the
existence of a property interest remain adequate today. Alexander's
concept of property, like Ackerman's, is intuitive, calling for an examination of what the ordinary layperson would recognize as property. His layperson's intuition, however, is far broader than Ackerman's, in large measure corresponding to traditional common law
concepts. Roth, in his view, is consistent with those traditional com16
mon law concepts. 7
Alexander finds it easy to use Roth to determine the existence of
property. He postulates that the distinctions between entitlements
and expectancies, or hopes and desires, are easy to perceive and
should arouse little controversy.16 8 An expectancy is less tangible
than an entitlement, "yet more crystallized than a unilateral hope or
166. Alexander, supra note L65.
167. Alexander argues that Ackerman's overly narrow conception of the layman's view of
property is meant to lay the groundwork for ignoring the issue of property as a threshold requirement, thereby providing more protection to the individual than warranted. Id. at 1552.
Those swept into the avoiding category include Professors Reich, Michelman, Sax, Berger,
Dunham and others. Alexander's claim may be too far reaching. His argument is that a "very
considerable expansion" of protection occurs if the property, vel non, issue is avoided. Yet, the
scholars he cites have usually been critized for developing theories that substantially reduce
protection. Nonetheless, it does seem apparent, as Alexander suggests, that the result in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), would be different using Ackerman's or Michelman's utilitarian calculus. Alexander, supra note 165, at 1555.
168. Alexander, supra note 165, at 1563.
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desire."' 169 Expectancies can be distinguished from entitlements by
considering the consequences if a third party interferes. Claims are to
be labeled "expectancies, unprotectible according to ordinary expectations, either because they depend on future recognition by another,
• . .because they are subject to another's unlimited power to extinguish the present or future enjoyment of the asset in question and
therefore are unprotectible against that person's encroachments,"1 70
or because, at the time of their creation, they were "vulnerable to a
1 71
legally recognized power of termination held by another person.
Alexander calls these relationships the "principle of subordinated
interests."' 72 He argues the principle "is not simply an expression of
various functional aims that courts have attempted to promote but
have not articulated. Instead, this approach represents a distinct conception of property that courts have used to distinguish property
from nonproperty interests.' ' 3 According to Alexander, Flemming v.
Nestor 7 4 is fully consistent with the traditional common law distinctions between property and nonproperty. It was the "government's
express reservation of the right to alter, amend or terminate" the social security program that prevented finding Nestor possessed a property interest.17 5 Subsequent entitlement cases are cited 76 in support
of the argument "that where the government, as the source of the
interest. . . retains unrestricted discretion over the future of the in77
terest, then the interest is not a protectible entitlement.'1
Alexander's concept of property produces a far more inclusive
outer boundary. With respect to IOLTA, however, it produces the
same result as Ordinary Observing. When the client loses physical
control of his funds, first to the lawyer and then to the financial institution, two third parties have the power to terminate his ability to
earn interest. Moreover, because the right to earn interest is a creature of statute, it can also be terminated by governmental action.
The power of the government to permit or deny interest earnings as
169. Id. at 1564.
170. Id. at 1566.
171. Id. at 1571.
172. Id. at 1576.
173. Id. at 1582-83.
174. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). Flemming upheld a provision of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 402(n) (1976), that terminated benefits to deported aliens, finding that the aliens
lacked an "accrued property right" to continued benefits.
175. Alexander, supra note 165, at 1584.
176. Alexander cites: Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) as properly decided entitlement cases.
177. Alexander, supra note 165, at 1586-87. How to decide on which side of the "at-will
for-cause" distinction a particular claim falls is not addressed by Alexander and need not concern us here.
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it sees fit, as part of the regulation of the national economy, is a clear
indication that the client's claim can only be classified as an
expectancy.
Focusing solely on a descriptive effort to define the term "property" or the term "ownership" does not provide a satisfactory resolution to the IOLTA conflict. The process is inconclusive. Missing is a
"why" element; a basis for determining how far property claims extend. Both Ordinary Observing and the principle of subordinated interests set an outer boundary that does not seem to include the income earned by IOLTA. While both theories seem overly facile, they
do lead to the same conclusion for IOLTA. Combining the descriptive
process with a normative theory of property does produce a more
conclusive, and therefore, more satisfying result. The use, however, of
a normative theory, in the absence of a generally accepted theory in
American jurisprudence, cannot definitively answer the objections of
IOLTA critics. 178 Yet from a policy standpoint, the review of these
theories does serve to highlight the lack of support for the IOLTA
critics' claims. Under any standard, a client's claim to the gross income earned by nominal or short-term deposits is not a property
right of sufficient magnitude to be afforded constitutional protection.
B. The Roth Approach to Defining Property: Expectation and
Reliance as the Sine Qua Non of Property
The fifth amendment protects private property from governmental appropriation without just compensation. State law creates private property and defines its parameters. States which have adopted
IOLTA programs have declared, either explicitly or implicitly, that
their laws do not confer a property right upon clients to the earnings
of nominal or short-term funds deposited in attorney trust accounts.
No federal statutory law supports the contrary position. The hornbook proposition that the owner of a fund also owns the earnings
produced by the fund does, however, support the IOLTA challengers'
178. American jurisprudence has yet to adopt, at least overtly, a normative theory of
property. The expectation and reliance theory of Roth, considered at infra text accompanying
notes 179-88, does not purport to be a normative theory. It has been suggested that at least
some members of the Supreme Court evidence a normative theory in their opinions. See Note,
Justice Rehnquist's Theory of Property, 93 YALE L.J. 541 (1984), wherein the author argues
that Justice Rehnquist has adopted economic efficiency as the norm for property adjudications.
The author also discerns a two-tiered approach, noting that Justice Rehnquist appears far more
willing to afford protection to traditional property interests when claims of taking are made
than when that protection first requires a finding of statutory entitlement. Rehnquist's approach is similar, if not identical, to Professor, now Judge, Posner's claim that the property
norm inherent in the common law is, and should be, one of "wealth maximization," a term
fraught with connotation. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ThE LAW (2d ed. 1977); Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
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position. Furthermore, after Webb's, a state's determination that no
property interest exists is subject to challenge on grounds it terminates a pre-existing property interest.
The Constitution protects the hornbook proposition only if the
fund owner possesses a legitimate claim of entitlement. The test for
protection stems from the decision in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, where the Court held that, "[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than abstract need
or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of
it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."' 9
The range of property interests protectible under the Roth test is
broad, but not unlimited. An entitlement exists if the fund owner can
identify substantive law that supports his assertion of a property interest 80° Entitlements "are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law - rules or relationships that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits."' '
In addition to positive rules of law, "mutually explicit understandings" may also serve to create entitlements."' s2
The distinction between "entitlement" and "expectation" is not
self-evident.18 3 Additionally, the Supreme Court has not yet developed a rationale for distinguishing between the two.' Roth and its
progeny fail to meaningfully address the critical question of when
positive laws or mutually explicit understandings are sufficient to create reliance interests that can be declared entitlements. Instead, after
Roth, the Court has focused on the nebulous distinction between entitlement and expectancy, and thereby embarked on an ad hoc, indi179. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
180. Entitlement theory may mark the return of the right-privilege distinction in other
colors. Smolla, supra note 158. If so, and this article does not adopt that premise, the IOLTA
question may be even easier to answer.
181. Id.
182. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972). The Court attempted to give meaning
to "mutually explicit understandings" by analogy to implied contracts and to "custom and
practice" of an industry. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981). Although not explicitly rejected, the decision in Leis ,v.
Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979), may cast doubt on the continuing
validity of mutually explicit understandings as a means of establishing entitlement.
183. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 158, at 548. One student author has
summarized the cases to hold that "a statute will create an entitlement . . . if [it] sets out
conditions under which the benefit must be granted or if the statute sets out the only conditions under which the benefit may be denied." Note, Statutory Entitlement and the Concept
of Property, 86 YALE L.J. 695, 696 (1977) (emphasis in original). The explanation is not
satisfactory.
184. The idea that a citizen's dealing with his government should always implicate the
two due rpocess clauses was rejected by the Roth Court. But see Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent,
408 U.S. at 587.
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vidualized consideration of whatever substantive law the parties
identify to support their claim of entitlement. A claim classed as an
"entitlement" is entitled to fifth amendment protection. Conversely,
a claim classed as an expectancy is not entitled to protection.
If the law identified is federal, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of whether the law creates an entitlement.8 5 If the law identified is state or local, however, the Supreme Court defers to state
court decisions to determine if a property interest exists. 86 In circumstances where the state law is unclear, the Supreme Court has
made its own determinations. 87
The IOLTA critic's search for positive rules of law stops after discovering the rule that holds earnings follow principal. The critic's
search is, therefore, incomplete. The critic must also search out all
the rules that expand or limit the initial finding, similar to the way
Terrell would search out the identifying characteristics that define
and describe property rights. 88 The distinction between net and
gross income is one such limitation. The restrictions on bank account
earnings constitute another limitation. Any claim by owners of nominal or short-term deposits to the interest earned on such accounts
does not qualify as property under the Roth constitutional definition.
Certainly, there are no "rules or mutually explicit understandings"
that the client will receive the interest. The time-honored practice
has been directly to the contrary. Moreover, an individual client who
directs his attorney, or his attorney's financial institution, to invest
such funds in an interest-bearing account should not expect to receive the gross income produced without deduction for expenses.
Arguably, IOLTA implicates the positive rules of law identified in
one of two ways. First, in accordance with the positive rules of law as
they existed before the advent of IOLTA, a client totally lacked any
real claim to the earnings generated by his nominal or short-term deposits. Although the assertion of no property interest is, from a legal
standpoint, difficult to analyze, no persuasive reason for rejecting the
assertion is apparent. Before IOLTA, nominal or short-term deposits
185. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
186. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), applied Iowa law to find a right to public school
education. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978), found an entitlement
to continued electric service from a publicly owned utility as a result of Tennessee statutory
law. But see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), where the Court rejected the
state court's finding that the claimant lacked a property interest. Webb's is, to the same effect,
specifically rejecting the state court's finding of lack of a property interest. 449 U.S. at 165.
187. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), applied North Carolina law to find that a city
employee lacked a property interest in his job. In a single concurrence to both Roth and Perry
v. Sindermann, Chief Justice Burger suggested that the Court abstain where the state law was
unclear. 408 U.S. at 603. The suggestion has yet to be adopted.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 147-59.
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simply did not produce income, except for the benefit of financial
institutions. The only change made by IOLTA is that banks and
other financial institutions, which previously enjoyed the free use of
such funds, are now forced to pay interest. From the client's perspective, nothing has changed. Second, and more powerfully, it might be
argued IOLTA modifies previously existing positive rules of law by
permitting costs to be imputed for purposes of determining net
income.
Government may extinguish property rights,8 9 sometimes with,19 0
and sometimes without, 191 being required to pay just compensation.
The usual entitlement case involves a state-created or federally-created benefit. When the government proposes to terminate that benefit, the question becomes one of due process,19 2 there being no dispute that, given appropriate procedures, the government may
terminate the particular statutory entitlement at issue.19 3 If the government's action takes property, however, as opposed to simply terminating a benefit, only just compensation, not due process, will suffice. 9 The inquiry is very different, however, if the government
denies action terminates a property right. If the claimant can support
his property assertion by identifying common law principles that indicate the existence of that right, the government's action will be
a non-technical sense, the inquiry beopen to serious question. In
19 5
rights.
vested
of
one
comes
189. The consequences that flow from the pre-existing status of a property right is not
always clear. For example, in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), whether the claimant's acquisition occurred after enactment of a law banning resale was said to be relevant to a takings
analysis of the claimant's investment backed expectations, but not a bar to the claim on the
grounds there was no property interest in the right of resale. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S.
677, 696 n.24 (1983), sustained the right of the Internal Revenue Service to sell homestead
property, not subject to forced sale under state law, for debts not attributable to the owner.
The Court held: "If there were any Takings Clause objection,. . . such an objection could not
be invoked on behalf of property interests that came into being after enactment of the provision." Id.
190. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
191. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
192. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
193. Where the statute creating, the entitlement also provides the procedure for termination, the Court has, nevertheless, generally rejected procedures that failed to meet due process
standards. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480 (1980); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). But see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976).
194. West v. Williamsport Area Comm. College, 492 F. Supp. 90 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Stringer
v. United States, 471 F.2d 381 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973).
195. The Constitution contains no specific prohibition against retroactive civil legislation.
The Obligation of Contracts Clause, however, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and the due process
and taking clauses of the fifth amendment have all been used to void retroactive legislation.
Note, Unconstitutionality of Retroactive Lien Avoidance Under Bankruptcy Code Section
522(f), 94 HARv. L. REV. 1616, 1625 (1981).
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Not all entitlements are of equal strength. The power of the legislature to abolish or modify property interests is far more limited
when the interest is the creation of common law than when it is the
creation of statutory law. For "there are certain fundamental rights,
an 'irreducible minimum,' that fall within the area" of constitutional
protection even if not recognized by state law. 9 ' "In other words, the
principles we have come to think of as constitutional existed and exist also independently of written constitutions.' 1 97 On the other
hand, claims of entitlement dependent upon statutes stand upon a
far weaker footing. Two nineteenth century cases clearly established
this point.
In Randall v. Krieger,""s the court validated changes in the state's
dower law, holding:
During the life of the husband, the right [to dower] is a mere
expectancy or possibility. In that condition of things, the lawmaking power may deal with it as may be deemed proper. It is
not a natural right. It is wholly given by law, and the power
that gave may increase, diminish or otherwise alter it or
wholly take it away. 99
A similar result was reached in Neilson v. Kilgore.20 0 At the time of
judgment, in 1876, a judgment creditor could seek satisfaction out of
196.

Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain - Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF.L. REV. 596,

602 (1954), quoting NoYEs,

THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY

432 (1936). Justice Marshall, concur-

ring in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), remarked:
I do not understand the Court to suggest that rights of property are to be defined solely
by state law, or that there is no federal constitutional barrier to the abrogation of common-law rights by Congress or a state government. The constitutional terms "life, liberty, and property" do not derive their meaning solely from the provisions of positive
law. They have a normative dimension as well, establishing a sphere of private autonomy
which government is bound to respect. Quite serious constitutional questions might be
raised if a legislature attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law rights in
some general way.
Id. at 93-94. Justice Marshall expressed the same view in Loretto, noting that, "the government
does not have unlimited power to redefine property rights." 458 U.S. at 433. While some have
argued that a majority of the Supreme Court has yet to accept a federal constitutional right of
property, the decision in Webb's can only be understood as the adoption, by a unanimous court,
of this view.
197. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553, 555 (1972).
Professor Stoebuck cites the famous New York case of Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 7 Am. Dec. 526 (N.Y. 1816) which required compensation, on natural
law principles, in the absence of a state constitutional mandate that compensation be paid. See
also Grant, The "HigherLaw" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67
(1931).
198. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137, 148 (1875).
199. Id. at 148.
200. 145 U.S. 487 (1892).
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the property owned by the wife of the judgment debtor. That practice was terminated by an 1879 statute. When execution was attempted in 1886, the court rejected the claim the 1879 statute destroyed a vested property right, stating:
The particular profits of the wife's estate here in dispute had
not, when [the 1879] act was passed, come to the hands of the
husband. They were not, at that time, in existence, nor, in any
legal sense, vested in him. Nor were they ever vested in him.
He had a mere expectancy with reference to them when the
[1879] act was passed. Moreover, his right, prior to that enactment, to take the profits of his wife's estate, did not come
from contract between him and his wife or between him and
the state, but from a rule of law established by the legislature ....
It is entirely competent for the legislature to change
that rule. o1
The distinction between statutorily created interests and traditionally created interests applies also to banking regulation. In Veix
v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Association,0 2 the Supreme Court
determined that a 1932 restriction on withdrawals could constitutionally be applied to deposits made in 1928 and 1929. Mr. Justice Reed
reached back to New Jersey's long history of regulation of withdrawals, stressed the importance of financial institutions to the state's
economy, and held the depositor, "when he purchased into an enterprise already regulated in the particular to which he now objects,...
20 3
purchased subject to further legislation upon the same subject."
More recently, in United States v. Rodgers,20° the Court held a
federal tax lien against one spouse could be enforced by the forced
sale of homestead property occupied by the other spouse, even
though Texas law barred such sales and even though the court recognized that homestead was a form of property. The court reasoned
that "[i]f there were any Takings Clause objection ... , such an objection could not be invoked on behalf of property interests that
came into being after enactment . . . [of the tax lien provisions in
1886 because] the homestead estates at issue came into being long
''
after 1868. 1o5
201. Id. at 490-91.
202. 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
203. Id. at 38. This view of legislative power dates to the earliest years of constitutional
adjudication. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
204. 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
205. Id. at 696 n.24. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), was cited
as authority. Where the issue is when legislation may constitutionally take effect, the bankruptcy power and the tax power, although both prerogatives of the sovereign, do not impact on
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The Rodgers' decision is subject to two interpretations. The court
might have meant the federal tax lien law predated the state homestead laws. Such was not the case, though. The concept of marital
property is a heritage of Spanish colonial days and was protected
when Texas entered the Union in 1845.206 Therefore, only the second
possible interpretation, that the claimant's specific homestead interest came into being after 1868, remains. Thus, it is not the date of
the creation of the general property interest that is relevant. Instead,
the relevant date is the date on which the specific, identifiable property interest of the individual was first acquired. The implications of
Rodgers are far-reaching. Can it be that legislation can limit the
scope of any property right acquired after the enactment of the legislation? 20 7 Where the interest is backed by historical property connotations the answer is no, for that is the very thing the fifth amendment was meant to protect. Where the property interest is, however,
solely a creature of statute, the answer is yes.
Earlier cases distinguished between retroactive legislation affecting remedies and retroactive legislation affecting substantive rights.
Today, if the consequences of extinguishing a right are identical to
the consequences of eliminating a remedy, the distinction is best
viewed in the context of whether the claimant's reasonable, investment-backed expectations are unduly impaired. 0 When a client deposits money with an attorney, a contract is created. Another confifth amendment rights any differently than any other valid exercise of federal power. The reserved power concept applies to all governmental activities. The Charles River Bridge v. The
Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
206. 1 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 82 (P. Rohan ed. 1977).
207. See Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A
Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96
HARv. L. REV. 973 (1983). The author notes:
I am inclined to suggest that no takings clause issue can ever be presented by a truly
prospective statute. One might object that such a thesis would mean that the government could entirely avoid the just compensation requirement by. simply announcing in
advance, for example, that all interests in real property were thereafter held subject to
the government's right to take land without compensation for schools, roads, fire stations, and the like. On the other hand, most takings clause cases involve real estate, and
given the old saw of real estate brokers that "they're not making it anymore," it is hard
to imagine how legislation restricting the use of land could ever be truly prospective. As
soon as the government announced that a certain use of land would henceforth be prohibited or that certain land might be taken without compensation at some time in the
future, the value of the affected land would be diminished, to the detriment of its current owner. There can be no new land; there can, however, be new security
arrangements.
Id. at 987 n.59. Reserving to the state the right to take land without compensation was practiced in Pennsylvania as late as 1800. Stoebuck, supra note 197, at 558-59.
208. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.17 (1977); Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
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tract is created when the funds are deposited in a financial
institution. Both contracts are subject to extensive governmental regulation. IOLTA is one such governmental regulation. It does not impair the legitimate expectations of the client in the narrow circumstances where income is produced only because of IOLTA. The
interest earned on nominal or short-term deposits bears no resemblance to property rights backed by historical connotations, the very
thing the fifth amendment was meant to protect. Arguably, no client
who deposits funds with an attorney after enactment of an IOLTA
program has cause to complain. Whether viewed from the perspective
of trust or banking law, as to that client, the IOLTA program is prospective only.
Retroactive legislation is constitutionally valid if it does not destroy or unduly impair pre-existing property interests. The newly created income claim of IOLTA proponents fails only if mutually explicit understandings or traditional common law rules have created
reliance interests among individuals who deposit trust funds with
their attorneys for placement in demand, or demand equivalent, accounts. The IOLTA critic will be unable to support his claim by reference to common law.20 9 The history of banking demonstrates an
individual's ability to earn interest on his bank deposits has always
been a matter of statutory grace.21 0 It is not a natural right. Rather, it
is the creation of conventional law. Subsequent statutes may prospectively withdraw privileges which previous statutes conferred. 2 1' More-

over, the trust law principle that a beneficiary is entitled to the net
income earned by the res does not furnish support for the IOLTA
critic's claim.
The client's claim to IOLTA-generated earnings is even weaker
than the creditor's claim in Neilson or the spouse's claim in Randell.
In those cases, prior to the law change, the plaintiffs possessed at
least a chance of acquiring property for themselves. The plaintiffs
only had a chance, an expectancy, because either the facts or the law
might change before their chance of acquisition ripened into actual
possession. Before IOLTA, the client had no chance, no expectancy,
not even an "abstract need or desire." In all probability, the client
209.

Technically, the trust relationship cannot be attributed to the common law. 1 A.

Scow. supra note 15, § 1. Nevertheless, for purposes of constitutional protection, it can be
considered a traditional or common law property right. Id.
210.

See supra notes 65-99 and accompanying text.

211. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). See Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603 (1960). "Federal regulation of future action based upon rights previously acquired by
the person regulated is not prohibited by the Constitution. So long as the Constitution autho-

rizes the subsequently enacted legislation, the fact that the provisions limit or interfere with
previously acquired rights does not condemn it." Flemming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947).
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was simply indifferent to the remote chance that his nominal or
short-term funds might earn interest. After IOLTA, the client's position is entirely unchanged. Therefore, to characterize the client's attitude as an expectancy is to give it far greater weight than it deserves.
The tenuous possibility of a client deriving income from his nominal or short-term deposit can hardly be characterized as an essential
constituent of the "ancient' institution of property," inherited from
the common law, recognized by history as a claim "upon which people rely in their daily lives" and, therefore, protected by the fifth
amendment.2 1 2 Instead, it is a matter of statutory grace, subject to
modification or extinction at the will of the lawmaking authority.2 13
The right to income from bank deposits can muster even less historical support. It too is not a natural right. It is solely the creation of
conventional law.214 As a matter of constitutional imperative, ownership of a fund does not always carry with it the right to any proceeds
that fund may earn. As stated previously, when the client loses control of his funds, first to the lawyer, and then to the financial institution, two third parties have the power to terminate his ability to earn
interest.
The government has long exercised its power by regulating the
banking industry. Before NOW accounts, the effect of governmental
regulation was to reallocate the income producing potential of demand accounts from depositors to financial institutions. The effect of
IOLTA is to further reallocate the income producing potential from
financial institutions to the provision of legal aid to the poor. The
power of the government to permit or deny interest earnings mandates the conclusion that no client is deprived of an entitlement. Absent entitlement, IOLTA takes no property belonging to a client.
Neither property law nor fairness compels the conclusion that the
owner of trust funds, funds that in their own right cannot produce
income, has lost any property because of IOLTA.
In summary, a client's claim to the interest earned by his nominal
or short-term deposit depends on his identifying a legitimate claim of
entitlement. The hornbook proposition that earnings follow principal
is balanced by the rule of trust law that the beneficiary is only entitled to the income net of expenses. IOLTA is best seen as a melding
of those two principles. It is a meld that does not violate the property
rights of clients.
212.
213.
214.

Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
See supra text accompanying notes 64-99.
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VI. THE TAKING IssuE ANALYZED

The familiar prescription of the fifth amendment bars the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation. 215 For
purposes of this section, it will be assumed arguendo that clients
have a property interest in the income producing potential of their
nominal or short-term trust funds. This section examines whether
IOLTA "takes" this clients' property interest.
Over twenty years ago, Professor Allison Dunham, after reviewing
eighty-nine cases decided in the previous thirty years,21 6 aptly described fifth amendment taking jurisprudence as a "crazy quilt pattern" which defies logical analysis.217 In the eighteen years after that
description was so aptly applied, the number of taking cases reaching
the Supreme Court appreciably slowed. 21" Few cases between 1962
and 1978 are of help in evaluating the IOLTA taking issue.2 19 Then,
in 1978, the pattern suddenly changed. The Supreme Court was confronted with a variety of fact patterns that directly challenged governmental actions as being a taking without just compensation. 220
215. US. CONST. amend. V.
216. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court ExpropriationLaw, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63, 64.
217. Id.
218. Broadly considered, there were at least 36 decisions in which the taking clause of the
fifth amendment was implicated. Most of the decisions, however, do not directly involve the
issue of whether "property" was "taken." Cases not applicable to the IOLTA question include:
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448
U.S. 371 (1980); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980); United States v. 564.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979); United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202 (1979); Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Alamo
Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976); Blanchette v. Coniiecticut Gen. Ins. Corp.,
419 U.S. 102 (1974); City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Dean v. Gadsden Times Pub. Corp., 412 U.S. 543
(1973); United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80 (1972); New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392
(1970); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970); National Bd. of
Y.M.C.A. v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969); United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967);
Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
219. Three cases in that time period provide marginal guidance. See United States v.
Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973); Almota Farmers Elev. & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S.
470 (1973); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970). The shopping center access cases,
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), come
to their conclusion in 1980. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
220. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1983); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516
(1982); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51
(1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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These latest cases figure prominently in the IOLTA analysis.
Current Supreme Court doctrine is most fully set forth in Penn
Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York. 2 2' In Penn Central,
the Court explained and confirmed its use of a multifactor balancing
test. The relevant factors that must be evaluated to test taking
claims are defined as the character of the governmental action and
the impact of that action onr the distinct investment-backed expectations of the claimant. The Penn Central balancing test does not produce determinate results, particularly in newly developing areas of
governmental regulation. In order to understand why the multifactor
test developed, a brief outline of the evolution of the taking doctrine
will be helpful. Before considering application of the test to the
unique circumstances presented by IOLTA, a review of alternative
doctrinal suggestions for solving the taking equation is undertaken to
shed light on both the difficulty of solving fifth amendment problems
in general and the IOLTA controversy in particular. Finally, IOLTA
is scrutinized on the basis of the current judicial doctrine embodied
in the multifactor balancing test.
A. The Evolution of a Taking Test
Early English attempts to resist the power of the King are the
genesis of modern fifth amendment jurisprudence. The Magna Carta
protected property. 222 It did not, however, bar economic regulation of
land, a practice which was widespread in England by the close of the
seventeenth century.223 The American colonists inherited both the
victory of private property rights over the King's power of seizure
and the understanding that regulation, even regulation that could go
so far as to prohibit all productive use of land, was a legitimate exercise of governmental power.2 24 Land use regulation was extensive in
both urban and rural areas during the colonial period and the power
of eminent domain was frequently exercised. Land seizures were usually compensated when developed parcels were taken, but not
otherwise.2 25
The framers of the Constitution were deeply influenced by English conceptions of property rights which were said to consist of a
person's "free use, enjoyment and disposal of all his acquisitions,
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 51 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as F. BOSSELMAN]. Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta provided that "[n]o freeman shall be arrested, or detained in person, or deprived of his freehold. . . unless by the lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land." Id. at 56.
223. Id. at 60-75.
221.

222.

224.

Id. at 80-81.

225.

Id. at 82-88. See Stoebuck, supra note 197, at 570.
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without any control or diminution, save only by the law of the
land. ' 226 The "law of the land" was a claim of parliamentary
supremacy over the King, not a claim of natural rights or a provision
for just compensation. At the same time, a claim emerged to a natural law power of eminent domain in the sovereign.2 27 Takings, therefore, required no compensation, -other than at the mercy of the
parliament.2 28
Why was the fifth amendment adopted? Legal scholars trace the
antecedents of the compensation clause to philosophers of the seven230 Pufendorf,23 '
teenth and eighteenth centuries, 229 including Grotius,
Bynkershoek,23 2 and Vattel.' 3 Compensation for land takings was an
accepted English practice during colonial days. Locke conceded the
power of government to tax and to acquire private property so long
as no man was charged with more than a fair share.2 34 Compensation,
therefore, was required to even the score when property was taken.23 5
By the time of the American Revolution, Blackstone had elevated
property to the "third absolute right, inherent in every English226.

F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 222, at 91-92.

227. Stoebuck, supra note 197, at 559; Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. (1 Otto.) 367 (1876)
recognized that the power of eminent domain was an inherent and essential power of government and that the federal government could exercise the power of eminent domain in the absence of a specific constitutional authorization. See also City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & N.
R.R., 223 U.S. 390 (1912) (the right to appropriate private property for public use is a vital
sovereign power).
228. Prior to the Revolution, compensation was a common practice in England, although
only as a function of specific parliamentary enactments. Stoebuck, supra note 197, at 575-79.
Compensation was similarly well-established in the Colonies. Id. at 579-83. Compensation in
both England and the Colonies was a matter of legislative grace, however, not judicial order.
The earliest state constitution to require compensation was that of Massachusetts, ratified in
1780. Prior to 1789, several state constitutions provided that property was not be taken without
the "consent of the law of the land." Others were totally silent. F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 222,
at 94-97. Nevertheless, in the absence of a just compensation provision, state courts required
compensation as a matter of natural law. Grant, supra note 197, at 71-81.
229. Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 596,
596-601 (1942). The scholars are agreed upon the individuals, although not necessarily the import of their works. Compare Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 54 (1964)
(the interests these writers sought to protect are difficult to ascertain) with Stoebuck, supra
note 197, at 559, 583-84 (there is general agreement among the writers that compensation is
required under the precept of just share and that an individual should not bear a greater share
of the government's costs than any other citizen).
230.

231.
1925).
232.
1930).
233.

H. GRoTxus, DE JuRE BELLI Er PACIS (1625) (F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM (1672) (C. & W. Oldfather trans.
C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLIci LmRI Duo (1737) (T. Frank trans.

E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRIMNcPLEs OF THE LAW OF NATURE: APPLIED
TO CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (1758) (C. Fenwick trans. 1916).

234. Stoebuck, supra note 197, at 585.
235. Id. at 587.
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man." 23 6 Early state constitutions usually provided for the power of
eminent domain, sometimes with and sometimes without a just compensation clause. It was always assumed, however, that compensation
237
would be paid for any taking.
Takings were not an important concern of the framers of the Constitution. This is evidenced by the lack of an express grant in the
federal Constitution of eminent domain power. Nevertheless, as
Blackstone explained, because the government could only take property upon payment of compensation, because of the controversy
caused by property seizures during the Revolutionary War, and perhaps because the framers were men of property, the fifth amendment
was drafted.238 Its substantive provisions remained unchanged from
its original draft to final enactment. No record of the debates, at either the federal or state level, has survived. Nor is there a contemporary historical record. 23 ' The fifth amendment did not break new
ground because compensation was the expected norm. Instead it confirmed what were considered established rights of Englishmen. Certainly, the framers meant to prevent unfair confiscation of private
property. At the same time, they also recognized that an essential
reason for government is economic regulation. Reconciling these positions perplexes legal scholars to this day.2 40
Taking jurisprudence begins late in federal constitutional history. 24 1 Takings were originally conceived of as limited to physical
acts, the "no taking without a touching" theory.24 2 The power of eminent domain and the police power were considered separate and distinct functions of government. Absent a physical invasion, the police
power could be exercised to abate a nuisance no matter how severe
236. F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 222, at 88-92.
237. Id. at 94-97.
238. Id. at 99-104.
239. Id. at 99-100; Stoebuck, supra note 197, at 593.
240. Professor Sax rejects the traditional argument that the core purpose of the compensation rule was to mandate the maintenance of existing economic values against government
diminution. Instead, he argues the central theme of the taking clause was fairness, aimed only
at physical takeovers of property, not losses resulting from economic regulation. Sax, supra
note 229, at 53-57. Stoebuck rejects Sax's reading as far too narrow, notes that Locke's then
prevailing theory of government called for the preservation of property, and argues that "compensation is designed to even the score when a given person has been required to give up property rights beyond his just share of the cost of government." Stoebuck, supra note 197, at 58687. As will be seen later, Sax's theory of the taking clause will permit an extremely broad range
of governmental action, while that permitted by Stoebuck without compensation will be far
less. See infra notes 270 & 338 and accompanying text.
241. The history of state law decisions, prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, and later incorporation of the fifth amendment, is traced at length in F. BOSSELMAN,
supra note 222, at 51-139. The first significant Supreme Court decision was not rendered until
1871. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
242. Stoebuck, supra note 197, at 601.
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the consequences to the property owner,2 43 thereby permitting almost
all regulatory actions. 4 Mugler v. Kansas2 4 5 upheld a state law barring the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors resulting in
Mugler's brewery becoming nearly worthless. The exercise of the police power to abate a nuisance, without compensation, was left unchecked so long as the government-did not actually take possession of
the property.2 46 The test's lack of fairness quickly became apparent
as society became more complex and the government imposed more
and more regulations restricting property use.
According to Mr. Justice Holmes, the power of the eminent domain and the police power were at separate ends of a continuum.
Holmes was an early proponent of a balancing test, stating that "the
question narrows itself to the magnitude of the burden imposed, to whether the tax is so great as to exceed the limits of the police
power."24 7 That view found its fullest expression in the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.2 ' s In Pennsylvania Coal, Mr. Justice
Holmes recognized that the exercise of police power could validly impair previously existing property rights. When the impairment
"reaches a certain magnitude," however, only compensation, and not
the police power, will sustain the action. 4 Mr. Justice Holmes explained that the difference between a taking and the exercise of the
police power was one of degree, not of kind. With the decision in
Pennsylvania Coal, the takings test had evolved from frequently artificial, fixed rules to a case-by-case fairness test. This fairness test was
an attempt to balance the police power against the right of private
property, primarily premised on the economic loss inflicted. Pennsylvania Coal's rejection of the Mugler distinction between taking and
police power constituted an extremely significant departure from
traditional takings jurisprudence and began the case-by-case approach to line drawing. Somewhere along the continuum regulation
turns into taking.2 50 The problem is to discover just where.
243. F. BossLmN, supra note 222, at 106-14. The physical invasion approach to eminent
domain, a literal application of the word "taken," led states to adopt a "taken or damaged"
standard for when just compensation was due, thereby permitting payment for certain nontrespassory governmental acts. Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 196, at 599-600; Stoebuck,
supra note 197, at 555.
244. See, e.g., Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. (6 Otto.) 521 (1877).
245. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
246. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (sustained a statute barring the manufacture of oleomargarine).
247. Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1907). The "tax" was
a requirement that the railroad transport children at half fare.
248. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
249. Id. at 413, 415.
250. Yet whether a "diminution of value" test is, or can be, meaningfully applied, is
doubtful. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (property can be regu-
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Current Supreme Court doctrine supports the claim that IOLTA
is not a taking. 251 Before embarking on the line-drawing analysis required by Penn Central, however, an examination of suggested solutions to the "crazy quilt pattern" is in order. This examination will
highlight the complex nature of the issue and determine whether the
conclusion that IOLTA is not a taking is buttressed by the work of
some of the leading writers ,in the area of fifth amendment jurisprudence. Review of all, or even most, of the scholarly works is impossible. Nor is it the purpose of this article to urge the adoption of any of
the suggested solutions. They are reviewed only to provide some assurance of reaching a reasonable result.
B. Scholarly Analysis of Takings
Prior to embarking on this journey, two things should be noted.
First, all the scholars agree that in the absence of loss, there is no
taking.2 52 Here, that basic requirement is ignored. Second, some of
the writers suggest legislative solutions. 5 3 Whatever the intrinsic
merits of their proposals, the fact remains the fifth amendment cannot be abrogated by ordinary legislation. Absent a constitutional
amendment, the Supreme Court is the definitive arbiter of the taking
clause.
Commentary falls into two broad and overlapping categories,
which can be categorized as rule versus policy. Those who suggest
that takings cases can be decided through the application of uniform
rules attempt to distill a set of distinctions by harmonizing prior
cases. The rules may or may not adequately incorporate the value
served by the fifth amendment. Even if they do, however, the rules
are difficult to apply to new situations.
The policy approach, in the takings context, attempts to delineate
the philosophical values served by the fifth amendment and assess
each claim of taking in light of those values. Professor Bruce Ackerman's "Scientific Policymaker" is the epitome of this method. 254 The
Scientific Policymaker, as opposed to his "Ordinary Observer," believes the legal system contains a relatively small number of princilated as a general rule, but if the regulation goes too far it will be considered a taking) with

Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (a city can enforce regulations which are in its
best interest even if it requires a businessman to abandon use of his property).
251. See infra text beginning at note 349.
252.

See infra text accompanying notes 254-341.

253. Id.
254. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 160, ch. 2. Ackerman's book is not necessarily a work on
constitutional law. Nor is his suggested methodology meant to apply to specific concrete cases.
Rather, it is meant to show the way to a sounder analysis of takings claims, a way which would
require major revisions in the way courts now function. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 163, at 357.
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ples forming a self-consistent whole, which Ackerman calls a Comprehensive View. Competing claims are judged in accordance with
the society's Comprehensive View.2 55 The Scientific Policymaker understands that the role of property law is to determine the way in
which user rights should be parceled out to competing claimants. 256
The real issue, according to Ackerman, is not to search out property
rights "through some mysterious intuitive process," but to concede
their existence and determine in whose bundle they belong.257 The
Scientific Policymaker, adhering to the bundle of sticks approach,
finds that almost any change in prevailing usage patterns constitutes
a taking.258 The merits of the change are assessed by determining if
compensation should be awarded, not by asking whether a taking has
occurred.259 This approach shields the individual from losses attributable to shifts in governmental policy and means that the "new property" of Professor Reich is no different, for analytical purposes, from
traditional property recognized by the common law.26 0
Ackerman posits that American lawyers largely espouse two different comprehensive views. One is essentially utilitarian. In the takings context, Professors Michelman and Sax are the leading exponents. The other, a reaction to utilitarianism, is labeled Kantian by
Ackerman. It emphasizes the rights of individuals, not collective
goals. Examples of both comprehensive views will be considered.
261
1. The First in Time Rule

Professor Lawrence Berger proposes a first in time rule to solve
the taking issue. That rule is said to derive from the paramount goals
of the fifth amendment, fairness and economic efficiency. "A decision
is fair if it is in basic accord with the community's sense of justice
255. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 160, at 11. The Comprehensive View, which Ackerman
rightly says the American judicial system lacks, could be any political philosophy.
256. Id. at 26.
257. Id. at 27.
258. IOLTA, of course, may not constitute a change as far as the client is concerned. The
banking industry is indirectly impacted, but that impact is caused more by a change in banking
law than by the IOLTA program. Some lawyers are also indirectly affected by loss of the privileges they received from their banks because they maintained interest free accounts. They are
in no position to complain, however, because they were never entitled to those benefits in the
first
place.
259. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 163, at 364-65.
260. Id. at 363. Ackerman shifts the analysis from the taking stage to the compensation
stage, arguing that it is the purpose of the Comprehensive View to provide the principles of
"just" compensation. Professor Epstein argues that Ackerman's utilitarian doctrine destroys
"the special place of private property" and is unlikely to lead to constant results: "There not
only would be an abundance of hard cases, but also a marked absence of easy ones." Epstein,
supra note 164, at 643.
261. Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165 (1974).
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• . . a decision is unfair if it offends our sense of injustice. ' '262 This
intuitive notion is Berger's key element; "normal community expectations should not ordinarily be frustrated by legal decisions. "263 Or,
put differently, unexpected acts causing severe loss are unjust if not
compensated. Fairness is paramount. Yet economic efficiency, meaning "the reduction to a minimum of the social costs caused by conflicts," is also critical to any sound theory of eminent domain. 6 4
Berger argues that the traditional taking tests fail to achieve either goal. The physical invasion test is far too limited, can produce
manifestly unfair determinations, and promotes economic efficiency.16 The noxious use test also produces manifestly unfair results
because of its "over-simplified" separation of good from bad, its failure to promote economic efficiency and its failure to account for social costs. 2 6 The diminution of value test, at least partially, accords
with the community's sense of justice and can promote economic efficiency. This test, however, fails to take into account all costs associated with governmental resource-allocation decisions.2 61
262. Id. at 167.
263. Id. at 168.
264. Id. at 169.
265. Id. at 171. Without exception, all the writers agree the physical invasion test is unsatisfactory. All would agree that compensation is properly due in situations involving a physical invasion and that is the current state of the law, although application is difficult and prediction nearly impossible. Moreover, although most agree the physical invasion test is a useful
guidepost, none argue it should be deemed to create a per se rule.
266. Id. at 172-75.
267. Berger argues that the enterprise-arbitral distinction proposed by Professor Sax in
his first article is unfair. Sax, supra note 229. Sax's second article is even more permissive. Sax,
Takings, Private Propertyand PublicRights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sax,
Takings, Private Property]. Both articles are discussed at infra text accompanying notes 33344. Berger argues the flaw in Sax's approach is "that it gives the government essentially untrammeled power to destroy previously established property values without paying compensation." Berger, supra note 261, at 180. Carried to its end, it may limit compensation to only
cases of physical invasion - an unfair and economically inefficient result. According to Berger,
Sax permits government decision making to restrict or eliminate one legitimate activity to benefit another. Berger would reach the opposite result.
Professor Michelman's position fares little better. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rxv.
1165 (1967). Professor Michelman's relevant variables are efficiency gains, settlement costs and
demoralization costs. Utilitarian theory holds that no measure should be undertaken where
there are no efficiency gains, or where both settlement costs and demoralization costs exceed
such gains. If demoralization costs exceed settlement costs, compensation should be paid, but
not otherwise. Michelman concedes that a realistic method of computing demoralization costs
is unknown. In addition, Berger suggests this approach ignores an important factor, that the
person benefiting from the redistribution does so at no cost - an inefficient allocation of resources. Michelman also asks whether the utilitarian calculus is just. To answer that question,
he looks at it from the standpoint of the rejected claimant who ought to be able to judge
whether in the long term he will be better off without compensation. Berger believes the concept of fairness advocated by Michelman is unrealistic and "would be perceived as unfair by
most of those who lived under it." Berger, supra note 261, at 182-84.
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In place of the traditional tests, Berger would protect the first
lawful use, what he calls "the first in time rule." His basic principle
of fairness requires that "every realty owner should be protected in
his reasonable expectations as of the time of his purchase

. .

with

regard to those variables under government control that affect its
value.

' 268

Compensation is required unless the owner, at the time of

acquisition or other detrimental act, knew or should have known of
existing or proposed government plans, implementation of which
would have the effect of decreasing the value of his property. All
other value losses would be compensated. Conversely, all gains directly attributable to governmental actions would be recouped to prevent windfall profits.269 If the government only implemented projects
that resulted in positive gains to society, there might be no net cost
to the government.
The first in time rule results in far more compensable incidents. It
would require compensation to those indirectly injured by a government project, such as those who lose access to a highway or suffer
from pollution caused by a new road,27 ° to those whose once lawful
activity is prohibited either to benefit nearby landowners 27 1 or in the
name of the public interest 2 72 and to those who are forced to expend
money or terminate their once lawful use.273 In order to promote eco-

nomic efficiency, compensation need "not be paid unless the damage
to the property adversely affected is substantially more than the cost
2' 74
of administering payment, essentially this is a de minimis notion.

Application of the first in time rule to IOLTA would mean no
compensation. IOLTA is first in time for all new clients' trust deposits. The client who deposits funds with an attorney would be charged
with the knowledge that IOLTA will strip his funds of any income268. Id. at 196.
269. Id. Berger suggests a variety of possible methods to recoup benefits, including taxes,
special assessments and excess condemnation awards. All have serious application difficulties.
Implementation would require extensive legislation and probably constitutional amendment.
Limited experiments, similar to Berger's proposal, failed in England. Moreover, a rule that
authorizes government to recoup the benefits conferred by its programs is contrary to "normal
community expectations" and thereby offends the community's sense of justice. That may help
to account for the failure of the English experiments. Id. at 202-07.
270. The first in time rule would result in reversal of a long line of access cases. F. BosSELAAN,

supra note 222, at 122.

271. Reversal of Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), would result.
272. Reversal of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), and Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51
(1979), would result.
273. Reversal of the long line of grade crossing cases would result. F. BossELmAN, supra
note 222, at 121-22. Penn Central must also be reversed, or at least that portion of the
landmarks preservation law which required the landowner to maintain the building's facade
unchanged.
274. Berger, supra note 261, at 201.
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producing potential. As long as the client is not forced to make the
trust account deposit as a condition of obtaining legal assistance or
invoking the judicial process, the first in time rule would preclude a
claim for compensation. 7 6 Moreover, even if trust deposits, in some
instances, cannot be considered voluntary, the de minimis and windfall profits elements of the rule would eliminate the need for compensation. The loss to the client, if any, would be far exceeded by the
cost of administering a payment scheme. The impact of IOLTA is
truly de minimis. Finally, the income is produced only because of a
government program. Gains in value attributable to governmental actions are to be recouped. Although the benefit calculation in most
situations would be exceedingly difficult, it is exceedingly simple for
IOLTA. Under the first in time rule, IOLTA passes muster.
2 76
2. Freedom of Use and Enjoyment

Professor John Humbach constructs a "unifying" theory by distinguishing the right to exclude from the freedom to use and enjoy.
Property, according to Humbach, is primarily the "right of exclusivity," the power to keep others away.2 77 An individual has a property
right when, and only when, that asserted right is enforceable in
court.2 7 8 The freedom of use and enjoyment is the ability of the
owner to make use of his property without legal sanction.2 7 9 The taking question is decided by drawing a distinction between government
impairment or destruction of pre-existing causes of action and government actions which restrict the owner's freedom to use and enjoy
his property, but do not impair or destroy any legally enforceable
275. The freedom of choice is whether the client must make the deposit, not whether any
deposit must go into an IOLTA account. If clients are forced by law to make cash deposits, as
may be the case at times, the first in time rule should not apply because the clients lack volitional choice and thus lack the opportunity to discount the impact of potential governmental
activities. Id. at 195-97.
276. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-CompensationCases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 252-54 (1982). It has been argued the exceptions
to the "unifying theory" swallow the rule. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465, 474 (1983).
277. Humbach, supra note 276, at 256.
278. Id. at 254-55.
279. Id. at 257. The author has developed an elaborate, point by point comparison of
"rights" and "freedoms." Id. at 258-60. It is more than reminiscent of Hohfeldan analysis. See
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 23 YAE L.J. 16 (1913). The dichotomy between
rights and freedoms, according to Humbach, can be deduced from the difference in result between United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (seizure of a coal mine constituted
a taking requiring government compensation) and United States v. Central Eureka Min. Co.,
357 U.S. 155 (1958) (government order closing gold mines during wartime does not require
compensation).
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right the owner previously possessed. 8 0
To effect a taking, the governmental action must have the legal
effect of depriving an owner of pre-existing factual predicates for one
or more potential causes of action.2 8 l If the governmental action only
prevents a use, however, such as the placing of funds at interest to
generate income, it is not a taking. Humbach attempts to escape the
inadequacy of that overly simple formulation by adding to it the concept of "deregulation." If a law is repealed, or amended, its effect
may be to terminate a pre-existing cause of action.2 82 Humbach separates compensatory from non-compensatory changes in law by distinguishing government acquisition of property for retransfer in some
public program from government reallocation of rights among private
persons, albeit for a public purpose. Only the first requires
compensation. 8 3
Use of the unifying theory to resolve the IOLTA controversy
280. Humbach, supra note 276, at 253. According to Humbach, "the holdings of Supreme
Court cases point unambiguously to the conclusion that the just-compensation clause meaning
of property does not include freedoms, at least not the freedoms of use and enjoyment." Id. at
261 (emphasis in original). Humbach concedes that "the rights/freedom dichotomy has not usually been the ostensible basis for any court's decision." Id. at 254. Whether this after-the-fact
descriptive definition is useful as a predictor for novel situations is open to doubt. It also depends on one's starting point, as in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1980).
281. Thus by imposing burdens on owners, land use restrictions reduce freedoms, but do
not eliminate or reduce rights. Humbach, supra note 276, at 269. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887), is cited in support of the rule. Humbach subjects police power regulations to two
limitations. The first is the general substantive due process limitation on the police power itself.
Humbach insists that the fourteenth amendment's due process limitation is analytically distinct from the fifth amendment issue. Humbach, supra note 276, at 270-75. Costonis, on the
other hand, argues that the police and eminent domain powers cannot be so compartmentalized. Costonis, supra note 276, at 485-95. The second limitation, derived from Pennsylvaniia
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), treats restrictions on freedoms as a taking if they "go
too far" on the principle that when a regulation "leaves a landowner with no practical use of his
land, the result is to render his right of exclusivity, though technically unimpaired, actually
nugatory." Humbach, supra note 276, at 270-73.
282. Humbach, supra note 276, at 286.
283. This position is derived from Sax's enterprise/arbitral distinction. Id. at 286-87. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, supra note 229, at 62. The distinction, as Sax notes, may not
always be obvious:
In a technical sense certain situations like workmen's compensation, since they may involve a payment to a government fund, seem to fit the description of an enterprise. E.g.,
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (workmen's compensation);
Nobel State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911) (Bank depositor's protection fund);
California Auto Ass'n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951) (assigned risk law). But here the
government acts only as a stakeholder for the redistribution of economic values to the
regulatee's private competitors, usually a customer or employee in these situations. The
clue that these cases are to be treated as non-compensable, non-enterprise situations is
the fact that they might alternatively be administered either through a private or a government agency. Thus the involvement of the government, when it occurs, is irrelevant.
Id. at 70 n.156.
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turns on whether a client has a cause of action against his attorney to
compel receipt of the income his trust deposit generates. Nothing in
the unifying theory helps resolve the basic question of whether the
claimant has a cause of action. If it is assumed the client is entitled
to any income earned under any circumstances, then the client does
have a cause of action, and IOLTA does take the property of the
client. If, however, the initial property question is answered by assuming that a client is only entitled to the income net of imputed
expenses, then the client lacks a cause of action and IOLTA does not
take any property of the client.28 4 It may not even impair a freedom
because banking restrictions and economic constraints, not IOLTA,
prevent the production of income. In the event IOLTA is viewed as
modifying trust law, and thus as deregulation, the question is
whether IOLTA constitutes a reallocation of rights among private individuals or a government acquisition in its corporate capacity. It is
possible to view IOLTA either way. Perhaps IOLTA is a reallocation
from financial institutions and attorneys to providers and/or users of
legal services. On the other hand, it may be a government acquisition
of monetary resources which the government thereafter uses to
purchase legal services for the poor. The unifying theory fails to provide a definitive answer.
28 5
3. The Rule of Presumptive Takings

Professor John Costonis postulates that the Supreme Court has
relegated property rights to second class status as a result of treating
regulatory measures as economic legislation. He suggests the property
values inherent in the Constitution, which he calls "dominion interests," are entitled to consideration more nearly equivalent to that afforded to constitutionally protected liberty interests.2 86 He also discerns a movement toward greater protection in recent cases28 7 and
argues that substantive due process concepts should play a much
greater role in decision.-making. 28 8 Costonis declares that taking issues, like liberty issues, should never be resolved on a per se basis.
Instead, the taking clause must be deemed to state a presumption
that may be, and in fact usually is, rebuttable by the government. To
determine if the presumption has been rebutted, a court must balance the "welfare principle" against the "indemnity principle." The
284.
245-48.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Humbach makes no attempt to resolve property issues. Humbach, supra note 276, at
Costonis, supra note 276.
Id. at 468-69.
See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
Costonis, supra note 276, at 468.
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former permits the police power to further the community's health,
safety, morals or general welfare at the expense of recognized property interests, while the latter protects the individual, and not the
community, from governmental acts that redistribute property
interests.8 9
In addition to rejecting the per se rule of Loretto,2 90 the author
also rejects a wide variety of distinctions with a long, although not
necessarily illustrious, history in fifth amendment jurisprudence. For
example, Costonis rejects distinctions between property as a "thing"
and property as a "relation," between "direct" and "consequential"
damages, between "permanent" and "temporary" invasions, between
"destruction" and "appropriation," and between "physical invasions"
and "regulatory incursions."' 9 1 Instead, Costonis proposes a four element decisional model.
The first element, the "dominant rule," holds that any governmental act that deprives an owner of a property interest is always a
presumptive, and never a per se, taking.2 92 Three additional elements
then determine whether the government has successfully overcome
the presumption. The first, termed the "due process-takings phase"
requires the government to establish that its redistribution is fair in
principle. The core value of fairness, whether a property owner has
been singled out to bear an unfair share, is examined by a "use-dependency" test, which measures the strength of the "connection between a measure's goals and the burdened property's use. 29 s The
test is designed to accommodate the public purpose and indemnity
concerns of the fifth amendment.
If the action is fair in an abstract sense, the second element,
termed the "pure takings phase," considers whether the governmental action is fair as applied or whether it infringes more severely upon
the property taken than is required to achieve its intended goals.2 94
The third element imposes a graduated burden of proof upon the
government, the extent of the burden depending primarily upon the
289. Id. at 477-78.
290. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Costonis, who participated in the Teleprompter litigation, rejects the per se rule applied by the Court, but does not fully assess the outcome if the Court
had used his suggested decisional model. Depending on judicial view, it is possible for a court to
decide Loretto either way using the Costonis model. That very real possibility seriously undercuts the value of the model.
291. Costonis, supra note 276, at 467.
292. Id. at 469.
293. Id. at 488 (emphasis in original). Costonis agrees with Professor Sax that "fairness"
is the dominant goal of the taking clause, not the preservation of existing property rights. Id. at
507. That reading of history is necessary to Costonis' analysis, but probably not consistent with
the intent of the framers.
294. Id. at 495.
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relative weight assigned to the specific welfare and indemnity
values.2 95
Application of the theory starts with a presumption of taking if
even one stick from the client's bundle has been removed, causing
the burden to shift to the government to justify removal of the particular right at issue. 2118 A taking will be found unless the reason for
the governmental measure and the use of the property are sufficiently
linked 9 7 so that the owner has not been unfairly singled out to bear a
loss that should be distributed to the public in general 2 98 If a program is found to be fair in principle, the "pure takings inquiry" asks
whether a measure has "gone too far" by imposing a burden greater
than necessary to implement the legislative scheme. 99 Somewhat
akin to substantive due process in the Lochner era, this element asks
whether the burden imposed on the owner is more onerous than necessary to achieve the legislative purpose.
Costonis reserves to the graduated burden of proof element the
resolution of the ambiguous nature of his other criteria. He proposes
a sliding scale, much like three-tiered equal protection analysis, and
suggests that the "level of scrutiny. . will depend upon the identity
of the competing welfare and indemnity values at issue and the precise manner . . of infringement." 30 0 The government's burden will
295. Id. at 499. Costonis equates the per se approach to the equal protection standard of
strict scrutiny (or, in fact, something even stronger than strict scrutiny) and the Penn Central
balancing process to a rational relationship test. Clear takings cases would utilize the strict
scrutiny standard. Clear non-takings cases would use the rational basis test. Difficult cases
would employ the intermediate standard of review found in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976),
which requires a substantial relationship between the action taken and the end to be achieved.
How one first determines the appropriate test, and how one then applies that test, is not fully
answered by Costonis.
296. Costonis does accept that at times analysis must begin with whether there is a property right, but submits that in almost all cases the property stick issue is conceded. Costonis,
supra note 276, at 484.
297. The notion of linkage seems to be a resurrection of the noxious use test, abandoned
long ago. Linkage is swallowed by economic expectation. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S.
464 (1938); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 302 U.S. 485 (1938); Norman v. Baltimore &
0. R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935). Public purpose is sufficient to sustain regulatory acts without
regard to evil. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 104.
298. Costonis, supra note 276, at 487. The meaning of linkage is not well-developed. Costonis rejects the all-encompassing linkage argument that derives from Munn v. People of Illinois, 94 U.S. (4 Otto.) 113 (1877), but nevertheless seems to use the universally discredited
"nuisance" test. He argues that "use-dependent invasions - those predicated on government's
effort to control legislatively-declared evils associated with the burdened land's use - should
not be categorized as takings provided that government establishes a plausible connection between the evil and the use of the land." Id. at 492-93 (emphasis in original). Apparently, the
lesser the evil, the greater the government's burden of proof.
299. Id. at 496. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 74, supports this
element.
300. Costonis, supra note 276, at 499. That the Supreme Court has never enunciated such
a rule is conceded. Id.
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be greatest where less established police powers conflict with dominion interests. Conversely, the government's burden will be minimal
where clearly established police powers conflict only with an owner's
economic interests.30 '
Costonis chastises those who criticize his model for failing to predict the outcome of particular controversies or for leaving substantial

room for political value judgments.30 2 Yet his model does just that.

The analysis needed to balance welfare versus indemnity interests, to
decide if legislation has gone too far, and to choose a standard of
review, seems more complex, and no more predictable, than the multifactor balancing test. Its value to the IOLTA issue is that it moves
the decision-making process away from a per se rule and thereby permits consideration of more. relevant factors.
Translating Costonis' general principles to specific application is
not an easy task. If IOLTA removes even one stick from the bundle,
it is presumptively a taking. The welfare values benefited by IOLTA,
a mechanism for providing more equal access to justice, are powerful.
The indemnity values are weak because the owner's dominion interest, whether deemed to rest on economic or non-economic concerns,
is not meaningfully impaired.30 3 Although the linkage is slight, and
the only "evil" IOLTA eliminates is the financial institution's free
use of client money, it is hard to conclude that IOLTA is not fair in
principle. IOLTA does not violate the pure takings analysis because
it is also fair as applied.304 Moreover, IOLTA meets a test of fairness
that requires the government to make "a more than minimally plausible case" for fairness. IOLTA passes muster under the presumptive
taking test.
4. Utilitarianism, Efficiency and Fairness"0 5
Professor Frank Michelman explores the relationship of ethical
concepts and Supreme Court doctrine from a-utilitarian perspective
as modified by John Rawls' concept of fairness. According to
301. Id. at 500.
302. Id. at 524.
303. Two values can be identified. The first, growing out of Honor 's right of use is, in the
IOLTA context, the right to commit economic waste by continuing the practice of keeping
funds in non-interest bearing accounts. It is not a value meriting serious concern. The second
value could be deemed a "right of refusal" to assist in rendering legal aid. Yet if public funds
are constitutionally available for legal aid purpose - a use not open to real challenge - then
IOLTA cannot be challenged because the client is not in favor of legal aid to the poor.
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 74.
304. That it is fair as applied rests upon the fact of no economic loss to the client and the
tenuous nature of an "entitlement" to interest.
305. Michelman, supra note 267.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss4/3

62

Siegel: Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account Programs: Do They "Take" "Prop
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

Michelman, a strictly utilitarian theory of compensation would consider three criteria: efficiency gains, demoralization costs, and settlement costs."' 6 No project should be undertaken absent efficiency
gains. Nor should a measure be undertaken if either settlement costs
or demoralization costs exceed efficiency gains. If compensation must
be paid, there will be settlement costs, but not demoralization costs.
Conversely, if compensation is not paid, there will be demoralization
costs, but not settlement costs. Because society must bear one cost or
the other, compensation is due whenever demoralization costs exceed
30 7
settlement costs, and not otherwise.
Utilitarian philosophy, according to Michelman, does not furnish
the full answer. Any system must also serve an individual liberty notion, a concept of "fairness" that Michelman derives from Rawls 08
Fairness assures each individual the maximum liberty consistent with
the corresponding liberty enjoyed by every other individual. Departures from equality are just if everyone has the opportunity to benefit
from the differential treatment and the arrangement can reasonably
be supposed to work to the advantage of all, particularly those who
receive the least advantageous treatment. Efficiency-motivated governmental actions require compensation if they impair liberties unequally. Departures from full compensation, however, are permitted
if the long range effect of the action will advantage the least favora306.

According to Michelman:

"Efficiency gains" are defined as the excess of benefits produced by a measure over losses
inflicted by it, where benefits are measured by the total number of dollars which prospective gainers would be willing to pay to secure adoption, and losses are measured by
the total number of dollars which prospective losers would insist on as the price of agreeing to adoption. "Demoralization costs" are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value
necessary to offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically
from the realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest)
caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment
on some other occasion. "Settlement costs" are measured by the dollar value of the time,
effort, and resources which would be required in order to reach compensation settlements adequate to avoid demoralization costs. Included are the costs of settling not only
the particular compensation claims presented, but also those of all persons so affected by
the measure in question or similar measures as to have claims not obviously distinguishable by the available settlement apparatus.
Michelman, supra note 267, at 1214 (footnotes omitted).
307. Id. at 1215.
308. Rawls, Justice as Fairness,67 PHiL. REv. 164 (1958); ConstitutionalLiberty and the
Concept of Justice, in NOMOS VI, Justice 98 (1963); The Sense of Justice, 72 PHaL. REv. 281
(1963). The contrast between utilitarian concerns and individual liberties is also evident in
Ackerman's distinction between Utilitarian and Kantian adjudication. B. ACKERMAN, supra note
160.
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bly benefited individual.""
The fifth amendment protects individuals against the "evil" of
collective actions that immediately harm some individuals in order to
benefit other individuals whose "claim to satisfaction has been
ranked as intrinsically superior."310 Such burdens are acceptable if
they are distributed "evenly" enough to make everyone a net gainer.
The utilitarian approach and the individualistic approach, grounded
in justice or fairness, thereby implicate the same criteria and often
lead to the same result.311 The tests, in Michelman's view, are not
inconsistent with existing Supreme Court taking doctrine, although
they obviously call for far different results in some situations.
According to Michelman, the physical invasion test is, at most, "a
convenience for identifying clearly compensable occasions.

312

It can-

not, however, justify refusal to compensate and the test fails to the
extent it requires compensation for relatively insignificant losses.
Nevertheless, using utilitarian calculus, the physical invasion test, although arbitrary, does protect against high demoralization costs. At
the same time, however, it fails a fairness test where the relevant
comparison is between large and small losses.3 '3 The diminution of
309. Michelman, supra note 267, at 1220-21. The issue is whether a specific decision not
to compensate is fair.
By the very asking of the question we adopt the vantage point of the disappointed claimant and assume on his part a capacity (a) to appraise his treatment and calculate his
advantage over a span of time (that is, he is not without patience) and (b) to view the
particular decision in question as a specific manifestation of a general practice which will
be applied consistently to situations involving other people.
Id. at 1221. The relevant risk of always requiring compensation is that settlement costs wil
force abandonment of efficient projects as compared with a less stringent compensation practice
which may sustain concentrated losses directed at specific individuals without offsetting benefits. Id. at 1222.
310. Id. at 1225.
311. Id. at 1225-26. Michelman suggests that a philosophy grounded in efficiency and a
philosophy grounded in fairness will often produce the same outcome:
If we set about to make practical use of this approach, we shall find ourselves asking
much the same questions to determine whether a compensability decision is fair as were
suggested by the utilitarian approach. The relevant risks plainly are minimized by insistence on compensation when settlement costs are low, when efficiency gains are dubious,
and when the harm concentrated on one individual is unusually great. They are also
minimized if insistence on compensation is relaxed when there are visible reciprocities of
burden and benefit, or when burdens similar to that for which compensation is denied
are concomitantly imposed on many other people (indicating that settlement costs are
high and that those sustaining the burden are probably incurring relatively small net
losses - else, being many, they probably could have been mobilized to deflect the measure which burdens them).
Id. at 1223.
312. Id. at 1228 (emphasis in original).
313. Id. at 1229.
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value test recognizes expectations, and thus demoralization costs,
where enforcement of restrictions would "totally defeat a distinctly
crystallized expectation. '314 A balancing test is aimed "at discovering
not whether a measure is or is not efficient, but whether it is so obviously efficient as to quiet the potential outrage of persons 'unavoidably' scarified in its inte:rest. 5' 15 Similarly, the function of the "harmprevention/benefit-extraction dichotomy" is to decide whether a potential occasion for compensation exists, not whether compensation
shall be paid.3 16 Utilitarian calculus
easily allows that compensation need not be paid in respect of
investments which, when they were made, either (a) interrupted someone else's enjoyment of an economic good, as
should have been apparent; or (b) were of a sort which society
has adequately made known should not become the object of
expectations of continuing enjoyment.3 1 7
314. Id. at 1233.
315. Id. at 1235 (emphasis in original).
316. Id. at 1239.
317. Id. at 1241. A slightly different version of utilitarian calculus is offered by Professor
Ackerman. His starting place is the same, the most efficient resource allocation. Ackerman
posits, however, that the concept of demoralization costs more accurately includes two elements, uncertainty costs and disaffection costs. When a property redistribution occurs, compensation is a function of three factors: (1) uncertainty costs, ("U); (2) process costs, ("P"); and, (3)
disaffection costs, ("D"). Uncertainty costs are the result of risk-adverse persons taking economically inefficient measures to protect themselves from unexpected governmental actions.
Process costs are the costs of compensation plus the costs of claims processing. Disaffection
costs are incurred when individuals perceive that governmental actions may not be fair. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 160, at 44-46. Only process costs can be estimated with any degree of reliability. Moreover, the decision to compensate or not to compensate will often be a function of
judicial outlook. According to Ackerman, the restrained utilitarian judge is most responsive to
just compensation claims as process costs decline, as uncertainty costs increase and as the general utility of the legislation is increasingly subject to reasonable doubt. Where uncertainty
costs are high, or process costs are low, a claim for compensation receives "sympathic scrutiny."
Id. at 45-46. Whenever the sum of uncertainty costs and disaffection costs exceeds process
costs, compensation should be paid. Id. at 47. The activist utilitarian judge, on the other hand,
is less sanguine of the good intentions of government. He believes the government in its "entrepreneurial" capacity will seek resources not justified on a "sober utilitarian cost-benefit analysis" and will make decisions on a partisan or corrupt basis. Id. at 50-58. The activist judge
committed to implementation of a utilitarian comprehensive view would seek to identify "the
social group which can bear the burden. . . with the smallest loss in overall utility." He would
consider: (1) cost of insurance; (2) cost of disaffection; (3) cost of settlement; (4) potential for
abuse by the state; and, (5) relationship of just compensation law to the overall distribution of
property rights. Id. at 64. Ackerman's utilitarian calculus reduces to a formula. "The critical
question, in any given class of cases, is whether P
U + D, where P = process costs, U =
uncertainty costs, and D = costs of citizen disaffection. If P > U + D, compensation should be
denied. If P < U + D, it should be granted." Id. at 48-49 (footnotes omitted).
According to Ackerman, his approach differs from that of Professor Michelman's because:
It is true that, in his genetal account of the Utilitarian's compensation calculus,
Michelman does not relate his argument as clearly as he might to the restrained concep-
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The utilitarian approach has been roundly criticized. Among
other criticisms, it is said to prefer collective goals to the exclusion of
individual rights, causing some critics to view it as a device to escape
those parts of the social compact embedded in the Constitution. A
constant theme is the impossibility of solving the utilitarian equation. Neither efficiency gains nor demoralization costs are subject to
actual measurement."' Utilitarianism would open wide the doors to
compensation. In particular, recipients of social security, welfare and
other governmentally conferred benefits stand to benefit. Conversely,
utilitarian theory would not recognize per se decision-making,
thereby closing the door on presently compensable acts where little
real loss is incurred. 1 9
Utilitarian calculus would approve IOLTA. It tends to maximize
efficient resource allocation. Unused resources are directed toward a
worthy social goal. The program is clearly a promoter of net social
utility. Yet there is a cost. Commercial banks would suffer demoralization costs because of the loss of interest-free money. Other financial institutions, however, would benefit because NOW accounts permit them to attract a new source of funds. One could conclude the
gains and losses for the different types of financial institutions balance.32 0 The client's position is unchanged. There are no surprises.
Demoralization costs should be minimal. Clients who understood the
mechanics of IOLTA would not think it unfair that the interest generated does not go to them because they would realize that, standing
on their own, they cannot receive any income. Some clients might
incur demoralization costs as a result of their dislike of civil legal
assistance to the poor. Such individuals, however, should be relatively few and their concerns should be greatly outweighed by the net
tion of judicial role. Nor does he distinguish clearly between the Appeal to General Uncertainty and the Appeal to Citizen Disaffection. On a substantive rather than methodological level, Michelman seems to emphasize far too little the importance of reasonable
doubt as to the Utilitarian basis of the challenged legislation in leading a restrained
judge to order compensation of those who have lost by the doubtful decision.
Id. at 49 (footnotes omitted).
318. See Posner, supra note 178, at 111-19; Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 510-11 (1980).
319. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), would certainly have been decided differently.
320. While the deposit of client trust funds in NOW accounts produces positive utility
gains as between clients, attorneys, and providers and consumers of legal services to the poor,
one cannot be sure, if it were possible to factor in banks, their employees and stockholders, that
IOLTA is a creator of positive utility - no matter how likely that seems. The calculus is lacking. Nor do we know the limits of whose gains and losses we must consider. See Posner, The
Ethical and PoliticalBasis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HoFsTMA
L. REV. 487, 491 (1980). If one applies Posner's theory of wealth maximization, however, IOLTA
should be permitted.
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utility of the program. Settlement costs would be high if compensation was required. Indeed, the cost of compensation plus the cost of
administration would exceed the net benefit to society. Utilitarian
calculus should, therefore, lead to the conclusion that compensation
is not required.
5. Individualism

3 21

Professor Richard Epstein argues there "is a clear collision between the traditional notions of property as a source of individual
autonomy and the power of the state to regulate its use and disposition. 3 22 Epstein believes the multifactor balancing test is not a test
at all. Instead, he believes it permits the court to reach whatever result it wants in a particular case. At the same time, Epstein feels the
test "blocks the development of a rigorous theory with which to harmonize the cases, thereby making each new decision an embarrass'3 23
ment to those that have preceded it.
The critical question to Epstein is whether the governmental action can be justified: "[C]learly an account of the police power requires some limited class of ends that it is proper to achieve without
compensation. Whatever their weaknesses, the traditional antinuisance justifications of the police power at least had this desirable
characteristic."3 24 The police power, therefore, "should be construed
to recognize in the state no lesser - but no greater - rights than
3 25
private individuals have in their relationships with each other.
Epstein's view of the scope of the police power is far too limited.2 6
Nevertheless, standing alone, that simple formulation may validate
321. Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. CT.
REv. 351.
322. Id. at 352.
323. Id. Epstein proposes a four-part test to replace the multifactor balancing test: Has
property been taken? If so, was it taken for public use? Has the taking been accompanied by
just compensation? If not, was the taking justified by the police power? Id. at 353. Only the last
question is relevant here.
324. Id. at 370.
325. Id. at 354. If carried to its logical conclusion, limiting the police power to those acts
which private parties could compel, essentially actions to abate nuisances, easements by necessity, and the like, would eliminate almost all land use restrictions. On this theory, Penn Central
constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power. When Epstein discusses Texaco and Loretto,
however, he shifts gears. The former is disapproved because less drastic means for simplifying
land titles could be devised. The latter is dismissed without explaining why promotion of
"rapid development of... a means of communication which has important educational and
community aspects" does not justify the exercise of the police power. Id. at 372.
326. Epstein believes the public use limitation of the fifth amendment has been stretched,
if not entirely ignored, and that governmental powers should be far more limited. Id. at 365-69.
See also Epstein, Taxation, Regulation and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 433 (1982).
Put simply, his is not the prevailing view. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321
(1984).
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IOLTA since two private actors, the attorney and the financial institution, have the ability, absent government prohibition, to utilize the
income from client funds for their own purposes.
A far different view of individualism is presented by Professor
Ackerman's Kantian Comprehensive View. Critics of utilitarian theory argue that individuals, because they are individuals, are entitled
to certain rights which cannot be overruled simply by an appeal to
general utility. In other words, the principle of exploitation prevents
viewing citizens as merely a means to maximize social utility. 327 The
Kantian judge's calculus is a function of three factors: (1) process
costs ("P"); (2) project benefit ("B"); and, (3) other project costs, including the costs of compensation ("C"). 328 A Kantian judge, even if
satisfied that a governmentally imposed redistribution serves a sound
public purpose and that society has gained more than a particular
individual has lost, would still require compensation if the process
costs were less than the net project benefits. Compensation would
only be denied if the process costs were so high as to make it impossible to compensate the individual without making all worse off. The
utilitarian, on the other hand, would deny compensation if the process costs were more than the sum of uncertainty and disaffection
costs.
The philosophical difference is between collective action and individual impact. Where P < B-C, the Kantian will always insist upon
compensation. Where P > B-C, the Kantian will never insist upon
compensation. In both instances, the utilitarian may reach the opposite result.3 29 A judge applying the Kantian Comprehensive View, unlike Epstein's notion of severely limited police power, would have no
trouble sustaining the IOLTA program. There is a clear benefit to
society. More importantly, no person is made worse off and no person
is exploited. Compensation, if required, would exceed the net benefit
to society and destroy the IOLTA program. Applying the formula, P
> B-C, a taking does not exist and compensation is not required.
327.

B. AcKMANam, supra note 160, at 71-72. Ackerman uses Kantian as a general term

and not a specific description of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
328.

Id. at 74.

329. Id. at 76. Hybrid theories are possible. A judge could well combine both utilitarian
and Kantian theories. He would be concerned with maximizing overall utility, but would still be
concerned that one citizen not be treated as a means for the gratification of another. The Kantian test would be first applied to see whether it was possible that nobody was made worse off at
time two. "If, however, such a solution was made impossible by virtue of relatively high process
costs, the judge would put on his Utilitarian spectacles and consider whether the costs of disaffection and uncertainty were greater than the process costs." Id. at 75.
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6. Spillover33 0
Professor Joseph Sax initially suggested that governmental activi-

ties could be divided into two categories. Where government acts in
an "enterprise" capacity as a competitor for the use of resources, its
activities are deemed to be takings. Where government acts as a "mediator" to settle conflicts between private claimants, however, its activities are not deemed to be takings.3 3 l IOLTA would be deemed a
taking if it was determined that IOLTA constituted the acquisition
of resources, rather than reallocation of resources from banks to the
provision of legal assistance.
Professor William Stoebuck's concept of transfers to the government is similar. 3 2 The core of his approach "is the principle that an
333
exercise of eminent domain always involves a transfer of property.
The word "taking" is given a broad, plain-English meaning. Yet
"[o]ne cannot find the transfer of anything unless he can visualize
and identify the proprietary interests involved. 3 3 4 The eminent domain power is implicated when the government's actions diminish an
owner's property rights by transfering them from the owner to the
government. 3 The usual land use restrictions, which benefit the general public, would not fit the transfer to the government element and,
therefore, would not constitute a taking. In order to avoid the criti330.
331.

Sax, Takings, Private Property, supra note 267.
Sax, supra note 229. According to Sax:

The rule proposed here is that when economic loss is incurred as a result of government
enhancement of its resource position in its enterprise capacity, then compensation is
constitutionally required; it is that result which is to be characterized as a taking. Yet
losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of government acting merely in its
arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-compensable exercise of the police power.
Id. at 63. Arguably, IOLTA enhances the government's resource position by permitting the
accumulation of funds to provide public services. Sax, however, recognizes that there must be a
loss before resource enhancement equals a taking. Id. at 76.
332. Stoebuck, supra note 125. His earlier work contains a particularly valuable part on
the historical development of the law of eminent domain. Stoebuck, supra note 197.
333. Stoebuck, supra note 125, at 1084.
334. Id. at 1089.
335. Id. at 1091. Stoebuck concedes his test restates Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887), with one qualification. If the police power restriction "is specially directed toward benefiting a governmental entity in the use of land in which that entity holds incidents of ownership," it may constitute a taking. Id. at 1095. Stoebuck also concedes his test is essentially
equivalent to Sax's initial distinction between enterprise capacity and arbitral capacity. It is
not significantly different from his earlier view that a taking occurs when the "government has
acquired unto itself a property right - an interest that is literally or effectively transferred and
increases government's store of proprietary interests." The police or regulatory power passes no
such interest to the government, although it may "decrease some private owners' property interests and may, in equal measure, increase other private owners' interests." Stoebuck, supra
note 197, at 570.
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cism that his distinction permits unlimited regulation (nothing is
"too far"), Stoebuck suggests the use of substantive due process as a
check on the system.
Professor Sax subsequently rejected his arbitral enterprise distinction. His revised approach, which he calls spillover, permits far
greater governmental regulation. He contrasts the traditional view of
property rights, which focused solely on activities occurring within
the physical boundaries of the user's property, with an emerging view
founded on a recognition of the "interconnectedness" between various uses of seemingly unrelated pieces of property.3 3 Sax suggests
that by changing the focus "[m]uch of what was formerly deemed a
taking is better seen as an exercise of the police power in vindication
3 37
of what should be called 'public rights'.
Sax's primary concern is with protection of the environment. He
argues the "dominant doctrinal model of takings law" is diminution
of value. Using that model, a court asks whether the owner's ability
to profit has been overly reduced.33 8 Sax insists the "dominant doctrinal model of takings law" is far too narrow. It frequently fails to recognize the impact one use has on another. Recognition of such spillovers would permit government to decide, without paying
compensation, which use is to be permitted, no matter how severe the
economic loss to the restrained owner.3 39 Conversely, where property
lacks a spillover effect, restriction without compensation is not permissible "simply because a neighboring demand would provide a
greater net benefit to the society."34 0 Adoption of a spillover doctrine
would justify almost all restrictions on land use. It would not permit
mandated use, however, and would probably bar physical takeovers.
Sax denies that his formulation permits restrictions whenever society
336. Sax, Takings, Private Property,supra note 267, at 149.
337. Id. at 151. Sax reads constitutional history to say that the core purpose of the fifth
amendment is fairness, not protection of private property. That reading is questionable. See
Stoebuck, supra note 197, at 586-87. Contrast the view of Pilon, who argues that "public
rights" are the antithesis of a free society and private property rights, that eminent domain is
not a legitimate power of government, and that most police power regulations, such as zoning
restrictions, amount to a taking for which compensation is due. Pilon, supra note 143.
338. Sax, Takings, Private Property, supra note 267, at 151. He also recognizes three
other models, the invasion theory, the noxious use test and the cause of harm test. Id. at 151
n.6.
339. Id. at 161. Spillovers include: (1) activities on my land that produce physical effects
on your land; (2) pollution of the common elements, such as water, air, and view; and, (3)
imposition of affirmative burdens on the community by the use of my land, such as construction of a new residential area, thus creating a need for additional police protection, schools and
other public services. Id. at 161-62.
340. Sax, Takings, Private Property, supra note 267, at 162. The fairness of Sax's proposal can be questioned. Perhaps the spillover theory's greatest deficiency is its lack of method
for determining which use to favor where there is a spillover. Berger, supra note 261, at 178-79.
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would be advantaged. Yet, the line between spillover restrictions and
redistributions to benefit society generally is not clear. It is doubtful
whether his theory for distinguishing takings from police power regulation furnishes much guidance outside of the realm of land use
regulations.
IOLTA affects the competing uses of financial institutions, attorneys and those in need of legal services. The placement of those
funds in a trust account has no spillover effect, as spillover is defined
by Sax. Of course, the "ownership of property [does not] necessarily
imply a government guarantee to profit from it when and as the
owner in his sole discretion wishes." '4 1 The application of spillover
theory to IOLTA is problematical. If all governmental regulations
which adversely impact on property values, but which are not premised on spillover effects, are considered to be a taking, Sax would
hold IOLTA to be a taking. Because the theory seems confined to
regulation of land, however, it neither justifies nor condemns IOLTA.
It simply does not provide an effective means of answering the
unique issue IOLTA raises.
None of the suggested solutions to the taking issue unambiguously require the conclusion that IOLTA is a taking. Indeed, several
lead to the conclusion IOLTA is not a taking. Paramount to all the
suggested doctrines are the justice and fairness concerns central to
fifth amendment jurisprudence. They buttress the conclusion that,
because clients suffer no loss, IOLTA cannot be deemed a taking.
C. The Supreme 'Court'sMultifactor Balancing Test
After the decision in Pennsylvania Coal,342 the Supreme Court
soon began to hold that "no rigid rules

' 343

or "set formula" 4 are

available to determine when regulation ends and taking begins. The
result was a multifactor balancing test, a pragmatic case-by-case resolution, which attempts to resolve the policy conflict between public
need and private loss. The test compensates for the earlier mechanical approaches which were based on: (1) the physical invasion test,
whereby government was only required to compensate if it occupied,
used, destroyed or took legal or factual possession of the claimant's
property; (2) the noxious use or harm-benefit test, whereby no matter
how severe a regulation's economic impact, it was not deemed a taking if it eliminated a noxious use or resolved competing resource use
problems, and thus served the public interest; and (3) the diminution
341.
342.
343.
344.

Sax, Takings, Private Property, supra note 267, at 169.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
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of value or "too far" test. The fullest exploration of the multifactor
balancing approach appears in Penn Central TransportationCo. v.
City of New York.3 4 5 Penn Central is an admission by the court of its
inability to develop, or even attempt to develop, a judicial doctrine
for determining when "justice and fairness" compel the shifting of
economic injuries from specific individuals to the public. The no rigid
rules or set formula is not really a test. Instead, it is a case-by-case,
ad hoc factual inquiry that has become the norm for resolving the
policy conflict between public need and private loss.
The core factors are identified as: (1) the character of the governmental action; and, (2) "the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations. 8 46 Perhaps
Penn Central's greatest deficiency is the failure to even attempt to
3 47
reconcile Mugler and Pennsylvania Coal.
1. Character of the Governmental Action
Prior to 1933, the owner of a demand account possessed the ability to earn interest from funds in his checking account. That "right"
disappeared with the adoption of the National Banking Act of 1933.
IOLTA does use private property as the catalyst to generate funds to
meet societal needs. Yet the funds that are generated are a loss to the
financial institution, which has no claim to them, and not a loss to
the individual client. If that use, without more, is enough to trigger a
per se fifth amendment bar, IOLTA programs are at an end. Such an
argument, however, is far too simplistic. IOLTA utilizes resources
previously neither used, nor capable of use, togenerate funds to meet
a critical public need. Requiring a private owner to devote, without
compensation, a portion of his resources to public use is not uncommon. Requiring it where absolutely no loss results to the owner
345. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
346. Id. at 124. The threshold property issues remain. A taking will not be found where
economic harm "did not interfere with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes."
Id. at 124-25. If there is no property interest, there can be no taking. Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Min. & Reclam. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The distinct investment-backed expectations criterion does not come into play until it has first been determined that a property interest has, in
fact, been taken.
347. There is no taking where, in the exercise of the police power, a particular use is
prohibited to the economic detriment of the owner, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), unless the regulation goes too far and destroys all viable economic use. Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). At least five Justices of the Court still adhere to the
"too far" rationale. See the concurring and dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, Powell and Rehnquist in San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981).
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should be a fortiori permissible.
There is one exception to the multifactor balancing test. The actual physical acquisition or permanent physical occupation of an individual's property is the paradigmatic taking.34 8 That kind of activity is the one thing the fifth amendment meant to prohibit. It is the
only per se taking rule recognized by the Supreme Court.
IOLTA does not result in the acquisition or permanent physical
occupation of a client's property. The client's property, his trust deposit, is totally unaffected by IOLTA. It remains subject to the client's control in exactly the same manner it was subject to the client's
control prior to IOLTA.3 4 " The primary case IOLTA opponents cite,
Webb's FabulousPharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith, did not apply the per
se rule. Instead, the Court asked, "[w]hat would justify the County's
retention of that interest? "350 Finding that the county's retention of
the interest was not reasonably related to the costs of using the
courts, the Supreme Court found a taking. The Court, however, expressed "no view as to the constitutionality of a statute that
prescribes a county's retention of interest earned, where the interest
would be the only return to the county for services it renders. 3 51 The
critical factor for IOLTA is that separating interest from principal
does not, per se, constitute a taking. With that threshold question
determined, application of the multifactor balancing test easily establishes that IOLTA is not a taking.
All governmental actions that impact on private property interests are tested by employing the multifactor balancing test, with the
sole exception of actual permanent physical invasions.3 52 It is the
348. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
349. The position of IOLTA proponents was nicely summed up in the Brief of the California State Bar, at 88, filed in Carroll v. State Bar of California, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209
Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984), appeal denied, No. 4 Civ. 31635 (Cal. May 2, 1985), to wit:
If an individual trust account inherently can earn interest, that interest is the principal
owner's property right. If the government appropriates that private right for itself, as in
Webb's, that may be a taking. If, however, the account is so nominal or short-term that
as a practical reality it cannot earn interest, there is no property right beyond that in the
principal. No interest is expected. The government may reasonably regulate the use to
be made of this principal, so long as it does not deprive the owner of all beneficial use. If
as a byproduct of such use regulation, revenues are generated that would not otherwise
have existed, the state may define ownership of that byproduct without offending constitutionally protected private expectation.
(emphasis added). The Carroll court, by essentially resting its decision on the lack of taking,
did not reach the property argument.
350. 449 U.S. 155, 162 (1980).
351. Id. at 165.
352. Compare Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) with PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Both involve temporary, or intermittent, physical
invasions. Both involve the public's use of private property. Because the invasions were not
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character of the government's action that is the critical determinant
of whether a taking has occurred. "[G]overnment regulation - by
definition - involves the adjustment of rights for the public good.
Often this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic
exploitation of private property. To require compensation in all such
circumstances would effectively compel the government to regulate
by purchase.3

53

"Government hardly could go on if to some extent

values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
' Therefore, compensation
for every such change in the general law."35
is not provided for a technical invasion of property rights which does
not harm the owner.355 If there is no physical invasion or interference
with the owner's present physical possession or control, the adjustment of "the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
3 58
public good" is not the type of activity that amounts to a taking.
A physical invasion takes the owner's full bundle of rights, the
very thing the fifth amendment was meant to bar, absent the payment of compensation. The removal of one stick from the bundle is a
very different thing, however, as the court made clear in Andrus v.
Allard,357 in which it sustained an absolute ban on the sale of protected migratory birds. Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
But the denial of one traditional property right [the right of
sale] does not always amount to a taking. At least where an
owner possesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not3 a5 taking because
the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.

permanent, however, the multifactor balancing test applied, not the per se rule of Loretto. At
least one state supreme court has held that Webb's, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), does not set forth a
per se rule. In First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Rosewell, 93 IlM.2d 388, 444 N.E.2d 126 (1982),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 50 (1983), the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a taxpayer's contention
that failure to remit the interest earned on taxes paid under protest and later refunded constituted a taking, in direct violation of Webb's. Holding that Webb's did not establish a per se
rule, and noting that Illinois did not assess a service charge, the Court held that the retention
of the interest earned (on a principal amount exceeding $1 million) was not constitutionally
prohibited. But see Comment, supra note 3, at 1017-18.
353. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 65 (emphasis in original).
354. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 393.
355. A good example of this rule is United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939).
There a flood control plan for the lower Mississippi Valley contemplated escape routes, over
"fuse plug levees," for extraordinarily severe floods. The claimant's land, historically subject to
flooding, was in the escape path of one fuse plug levee. Employing a balancing test, the court
held the fifth amendment did not require compensation because "the same floods and the same
damages would occur had the Government undertaken no work of any kind." Id. at 265.
356. 438 U.S. at 124.
357. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
358. Id. at 65-66.
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The removal of one strand is evident in many cases. Frequently,
the removal of that one strand is designed specifically to grant the
government or the public some specific use of the owner's property.
In Interstate Consolidated Street Railway v. Massaschusetts,3 5 9 a
trolley car company was required to carry school children at half fare.
The company alleged that the price restriction resulted in the children being carried at a loss. Mr. Justice Holmes sustained the requirement, emphasizing the importance of education and stating "the
present requirement is not different in fundamental principle, although the tax is paid in kind and falls only on the class capable of
paying that kind of tax, -- a class of quasi-public corporations specifically subject to legislative controls."36 0
Both PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins' 6 1 and Penn Central
deprive the property owner of one or more strands and compel him
to use his property in a specific way. The railroad in Penn Central is
compelled to maintain an existing use "in good repair" 362 in order to
preserve "structures and areas with special historic, architectural, or
cultural significance" for the benefit of the general public. 6 Likewise, to serve the public and not the owner, the shopping center in
PruneYard is compelled to permit strangers to enter and use its
premises for their own political purposes. These purposes are far removed from the nuisance s " or mutuality of land use restrictions, 3 5
justifications which sustained earlier governmental activities.
Interstate Consolidated, Penn Central, and PruneYard all uphold police power regulations that force a private property owner to
permit public use of his property, even though no claim can realistically be made that permitting the public use is designed to redress an
evil attributable to the property owner.3 66 In each case, the property
owner suffers a real loss.'
Yet laws that force property owners to
359. 207 U.S. 79 (1907).
360. Id. at 87. Penn Central and Interstate Consolidated are unlike the grade crossings
cases where, it is at least arguable, the railroads' own actions contributed to or caused the need
for safety installations. See, e.g., Missouri P. Ry. v. Omaha, 235 U.S. 121 (1914).
361. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
362. 438 U.S. at 111.
363. Id. at 129.
364. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
365. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
366. Some earlier cases went to great lengths to demonstrate that at least some responsibility rested upon the property owner. See, e.g., New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Com. of
N.O., 197 U.S. 453 (1905); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Illinois ex rel. Grimwood, 200 U.S. 561
(1906); Missouri P. R.R. v. Omaha, 235 U.S. 121 (1914).
367. In Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), Chicago condemned
a right of way over the railroad's tracks. The railroad's ability to operate was not impaired. Its
ability to use the right of way for any other purpose, however, was totally destroyed. The railroad's contention that its measure of loss included the value of the land was rejected, the Court
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permit their resources to be used in the public interest, or even force
them to make out-of-pocket expenditures, do not constitute a taking
so long as they serve an important police power purpose. 368 Most imtaking. Instead, they
portantly, such laws do not constitute a per se
69
are judged by the multifactor balancing test.

Is IOLTA a greater intrusion on property rights than section
11(b) of the Banking Act of 1933? With the latter, Congress permitted banks to benefit from the use of demand deposit accounts and
barred depositors from using their funds to earn interest.370 Unlike
the client whose funds are deposited in an IOLTA account, the pre1933 demand depositor suffered a real loss. The 1933 Act destroyed
an established entitlement.

71

Can it be said that reallocating the

benefit attributable to the deposit from the bank to the provision of
legal aid so changes the situation as to invoke the taking lcause? The
reallocation IOLTA makes is no different from the' routinely accepted
adjustment of the benefits and burdens of economic life. Moreover,
the usual rules governing client trust funds accomplish the same
thing as section 11(b) by restricting client funds to demand accounts
and effectively barring interest accumulation. Does IOLTA so alter
the relationship that just compensation must be paid? Unless a per
se rule is applied, the answer must be no.
Governmental action that prevents a use, such as the placing of
funds at interest to generate income, is not a taking. Banking law
changes may terminate existing income expectations. The loss of expected income, however, does not constitute a taking. Reallocation of
economic benefits among private persons, albeit for a public purpose,
does not require compensation. For example, if the state were to require the pooling of nominal or short-term deposits for any number
of reasons, such as to preclude lawyer misuse of trust accounts or to
facilitate supervision and regulation of the banking industry, no one
would doubt the constitutionality of the exercise of police power for
those purposes. Certainly, the clients would have no objection. They
would not be concerned with the internal treatment of their accounts,
so long as the security and availability of their funds were not adholding that because the only realistic use was as a railroad, there was really no loss requiring
additional compensation.
368. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911) (requiring contributions to a
depositors' guaranty fund, a precursor of the F.D.I.C.); Day-Brite Lighting v. State of Missouri,
342 U.S. 421 (1952) (requiring employers to compensate workers absent to vote); Dean v. Gadsden Times Pub. Corp., 412 U.S. 543 (1973) (requiring employers to compensate workers absent
for jury duty).
369. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1978).
370. See supra note 88.
371. See Steingut v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 161 F.2d 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 753, 807 (1947).
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versely affected. As a practical matter, that is precisely what happened before IOLTA. The IOLTA programs are functionally
equivalent to the combination of banking law restrictions and attorney trust account mandates that prevented interest from being
earned on nominal or short-term deposits. In terms of clients' fifth
amendment rights, there is no reason to view the state's action differently, dependent upon whether the banks or legal services providers
benefit from the interest. The character of the IOLTA program is not
remotely similar to the character of governmental programs that require just compensation.
2. Investment-Backed Expectations
The justice and fairness concerns of the fifth amendment prevent
shifting losses to a few individuals in order to benefit the public at
large. A de minimis argument, favored by some commentators, fails
after Loretto if the government action is deemed a per se taking.372 If
the government's action is not a per se taking, however, there must
be a real loss.3 7 The client whose nominal or short-term funds are
placed in an IOLTA account suffers no loss of investment-backed expectations. The client did not expect any income. The client is not
treated unfairly. In essence, the client has lost nothing. The fifth
amendment does not protect inchoate, unilateral expectations. 7 4
If there is no loss as a result of government action, there is nothing to shift. Mr. Justice Rehnquist posits that "it is the character of
the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as
the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is
a taking. 3 75 Superficially, his opinion for the majority in United
States v. Security IndustrialBank" casts some doubt on the "substantial" damage criterion. In order to avoid an alleged taking, resulting from the destruction of state-created secured creditor status, he
construed amendments to the bankruptcy act as prospective and refused to employ the multifactor balancing test to consider whether
372.
373.

Special Project, supra note 1, at 848; Baker & Wood, supra note 3, at 358-61.
B. ACKERMAN, supra note 160, at 203, notes:

In the cases that will concern us, the claimants have suffered a real money loss as a
result of the legislative redistribution of property rights. While this requirement of a real
loss may seem obvious, claims for compensation are sometimes raised that may be denied for failure to fulfill this threshold condition.
374. Note that this concept is used to determine, vel non, both whether a property interest exists and whether a property interest is worthy of protection. The former use is primarily
legal, although custom and usage may be relevant. The second is essentially factual.
375. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 149-50 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
376. 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
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the creditors' interests were of little realistic economic value. 37 7 The
critical fact in Security IndustrialBank, unlike the IOLTA situation,
was the total destruction of the creditor's property interest.3 78 Conversely, where only one stick of the bundle is destroyed, the analysis
properly rests on whether reasonable investment-backed expectations
have been unduly harmed.3 79 That was clearly established by a unanimous court in Andrus v. Allard.8 0 In Andrus, Mr. Justice Brennan
noted that "loss of future profits - unaccompanied by any physical
property restriction - provides a slender reed upon which to rest a
takings claim." 81 That view is fully consistent with earlier opinions
of the Court. "The Constitution is concerned with practical, substantial rights, not with those that are unclear and gain hold by subtle
and involved reasoning." 382 If a claimant is "not injured to the extent
of a penny. . his abstract rights are unimportant."'383
One might ask what compensation would be due if IOLTA were
deemed a taking? If the answer were none, it would be hard to conclude that any investment-backed expectations of the client had been
frustrated. By definition, if there has been a "taking" of "property"
in the constitutional sense, it must be possible to determine the "just
compensation" due the property owner. It is, after all, the failure to
provide just compensation that invokes the taking clause of the fifth
amendment. If no compensation is due, it must follow that no "property" has been "taken." In the IOLTA context, no compensation
would be due.
The normal standard of compensation is fair market value, what a
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller at the time of the
taking. 38 4 "[J]ust compensation means the full monetary equivalent
377. The concurring opinion would have engaged in the multifactor balancing test, except
for what it deemed prior binding precedent. Id. at 83, citing Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637

(1914).
378. Security Indus. Bank can be viewed as a partial taking case. In that view, the secured creditor has only lost that strand of his bundle which makes him a secured creditor, but
has not lost that strand which makes him a creditor. But see Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40 (1961). If the multifactor balancing test is then invoked, the public purpose served by
the Bankruptcy Act in eliminating potential creditor overreaching and abuse, coupled with the
minor economic loss suffered by the creditor, should result in the denial of a claim of taking.
That it was not denied demonstrates the weakness of the analytical tools furnished by the test.
Rogers, supra note 207, at 1014-21.
379. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
380. 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
381. Id. at 66.
382. Federal Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958).
383. Hooker v. Burr, 194 U.S: 415, 419 (1904). Accord Carroll v. State Bar of California,
162 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 209 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1984), appeal denied, No. 4 Civ. 31635 (Cal. May 2,
1985).
384. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); United States v.
Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss4/3

78

Siegel: Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account Programs: Do They "Take" "Prop
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

of the property taken. The owner is to be put in the same position
monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken. 3 85 The guiding principal is that the owner "must be made
whole but is not entitled to more." 86 He is entitled to what the property is actually worth under the circumstances existing at the time of
the taking.3 87 The fair market value of the earning's potential of a
client's nominal or short-term deposit is nil.
The fact that IOLTA accounts produce income as a result of the
aggregation of many nominal or short-term deposits does not change
the result. The value, if any, that accrues to the earnings potential of
the client's nominal or short-term deposit is caused solely by the operation of the IOLTA program. Compensation is awarded for what
the owner lost, not what the taker gained. 8 Increments in value attributable to the government's own actions are not to be considered
in just compensation awards. Compensation is neither increased nor
decreased because of an alteration in market value attributable to the
government's own activities.3 9 For example, if a government project
benefits a landowner when measured as a whole, the government is
entitled to offset any loss incurred against the benefit conferred. No
compensation is due because to compensate the owner "would be to
grant him a special bounty."39 0
Application of the rule that compensation is awarded for what the
claimant lost and not what the taker gained means that claimants
have been unsuccessful when recovery would produce windfall profits,391 where the value of the property has been enhanced by the totality of the government's project,3 92 where the value has been enhanced by government created scarcity 33 and where enhanced value
385. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16-17 (1970) (footnotes omitted). See, e.g.,
Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973).
386. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
387. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
388. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
389. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16-17 (1970).
390. United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1939). Where only part of a
parcel is taken and the value of the remaining portion is enhanced, just compensation will net
the benefit against the loss. United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411
(1926). The net benefit approach was applied in Washington Metropolitan Area v. One Parcel
of Land, 691 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1982), where the property owner's loss was offset by the benefit
he received from special high density zoning that accompanied the taking of part of his land for
the Washington rapid transit system. See also Bartz v. United States, 633 F.2d 571 (Ct. Cl.
1980) (applying the Sponenbarger test by which any losses of a landowner are offset against
actual benefits conferred), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981).
391. United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
392. "Since the owner is to receive no more than indemnity for his loss, his award cannot
be enhanced by any gain to the taker." United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943) (footnotes omitted).
393. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949).
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occurs because of the government's actions in its capacity as the sovereign.39 ' Moreover, the owner is not entitled to value resulting from
a right the government can grant or withhold as it sees fit. This rule
applies
whether the government acts, intends to act, or does noth95
ing.

In summation, the Supreme Court has said that "the general

principle [is] that the Government as condemnor may not be required to compensate a condemnee for elements of value that the
Government has created, or that it might have destroyed under the
exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent
domain."398

There is a major flaw in the IOLTA opponents' fifth amendment
claim because none of the clients would have a basis for compensation. The total absence of loss means that IOLTA has not taken anything of value from any client. Therefore, to compensate the client
would constitute a windfall. What expectation of the client has the
IOLTA program destroyed? None. Any income generated is purely a
function of the IOLTA program. The only "thing" the client has lost
is his ability to decide that economic waste is preferable to supporting civil legal assistance and other valuable public services. That
"loss" is not the type of loss the fifth amendment protects.
VII. CONCLUSION

If IOLTA removes even one stick from the client's bundle, it implicates the fifth amendment. The welfare values benefited by
IOLTA, a mechanism for providing more equal access to justice, are
powerful. The indemnity values, because the client's rights are not
meaningfully impaired, are weak. IOLTA is not unfair in principle.
No client is required to shoulder more than his fair share. No client
is forced to bear any burden. No client is stripped of any earning
potential. Instead, IOLTA recognizes economic realities that are part
and parcel of banking and trust relationships and puts that recognition to work in the public interest. That IOLTA operates at no cost
whatsoever to the client means there is no taking.
The IOLTA puzzle is not easy to solve. The legal issues are complex because IOLTA is unique. Resolution of both the property claim
and the taking claim is not free from doubt. It requires balancing
IOLTA's use of nonproductive nominal or short-term deposits and
the rule that beneficiaries are only entitled to net income, with the
generality that earnings follow principal. Clients are unable to earn
394.
395.
396.

United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 125 (1967).
Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 492

(1973).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol36/iss4/3

80

Siegel: Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account Programs: Do They "Take" "Prop
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

income on their nominal or short-term deposits because of banking
restrictions and economic realities, not because of IOLTA. Trust beneficiaries are entitled to the income produced by the trust, net of expenses. IOLTA uses the client's nonproductive property as a means
to earn income for public purposes.
The "newly created property" assertion of IOLTA proponents is
not a persuasive rationale for upholding IOLTA. It is the same argument that the Supreme Court rejected in Webb's. The issue is not
whether the property is old or new. The issue is who possesses an
"entitlement" to it. If the government did no more than bar the earning of interest on checking accounts, as it did in 1933, it would be
clear that no depositor was deprived of something that could be
called an entitlement. Checking account deposits after 1933 did produce income. That income, however, was retained by financial institutions. IOLTA reallocates income from financial institutions to the
provision of legal aid. The client's position remains unchanged. Simply shifting the income to a different use should not serve to create
an entitlement.
Nevertheless, in light of the intuitive feeling that clients have lost
something, a factually inaccurate claim, the justification for IOLTA is
better rested on the total lack of loss clients suffer. To characterize
IOLTA as depriving a client of a legal right to interest ignores the
realities of the situation. The client never had, and never will have,
the ability to earn interest on a nominal or short-term deposit. That
lack of ability is not caused by IOLTA. It is caused by the inherent
inability of such deposits individually to earn net income under any
set of circumstances. The alleged property infringement worked by
IOLTA pales in comparison to cases in which the Supreme Court has
found no taking. The justice and fairness concerns of the fifth
amendment are not invaded. If IOLTA is unconstitutional, only the
banks will benefit.
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